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2393 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE: ISRAEL, CANADA, AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Malvina Halberstam∗ 
On April 26, 2009, the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
hosted a roundtable discussion, Judicial Review, a Comparative 
Perspective: Israel, Canada, and the United States, with prominent 
jurists, statesmen, academics, and practicing attorneys.∗∗  The panel was 
comprised of Justice Morris Fish of the Canadian Supreme Court; 
Justice Elyakim Rubinstein of the Israeli Supreme Court; Judge Richard 
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; 
Hon. Irwin Cotler, a member of the Canadian Parliament and formerly 
Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada; Hon. Michael 
Eitan, a Minister in the government of Israel, a member of the Knesset 
(Israeli Parliament), and former chair of the Committee on the 
Constitution, Law and Justice; Professor Daniel Friedmann, formerly 
Minister of Justice of Israel, who proposed legislation to remedy what 
some view as serious problems with judicial review in Israel; Nathan 
Lewin, one of the most eminent attorneys in the United States, who has 
argued many cases before the U.S. Supreme Court; Janice Sokolovsky, 
a member of  the U.S. and Israeli bars, who has drafted legislation to 
regulate the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as 
petitioners before the Israeli Supreme Court; and Professors Elizabeth 
Defeis, Marci Hamilton, Michael Herz, and Shlomo Slonim, all of 
whom are prominent constitutional law scholars; an extraordinary panel 
by any measure. 
Professor Halberstam, who organized the Conference, addressed 
specific questions to individual members of the panel; all members of 
 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.  Professor 
Halberstam organized the Conference and served as the moderator. 
 ∗∗  The Conference was funded by the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy.  It 
was sponsored by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and cosponsored by the American 
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (AAJLJ) and the American Branch of the International 
Law Association. 
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the panel were invited to intervene with comments.  Following the 
roundtable discussion, Professor Friedmann, Justice Rubinstein, and Mr. 
Cotler made individual presentations.  The Conference was transcribed 
and the panelists were invited to edit and add to their oral remarks, 
which several did.  What follows is an edited transcript of the 
roundtable discussion and of the individual presentations. 
 
TRANSCRIPT1 
 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Judicial review is one 
of the great gifts of American jurisprudence to the world.  It was 
established over 200 years ago by a decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.2  It has recently been enshrined in the constitutions of a number 
of new states.  But, judicial review does not mean the same thing in 
every country. 
Judicial review in Israel, the United States, and Canada differ in a 
number of respects, including whether there are limitations on the kinds 
of questions the Court decides; whether the questions can be brought 
directly to the Supreme Court or are filtered through lower court 
decisions; whether Supreme Court review is as of right or in the Court’s 
discretion; whether decisions are made by the Court as a whole or by 
panels; and on how judges are appointed to the Court, all of which 
affect the nature and scope of judicial review.  More fundamentally, 
how broad should judicial review be in a democracy?  Should the courts 
be the ultimate deciders of everything or should there be limitations? 
I’ll begin by asking members of the panel to briefly summarize 
how judges are selected in each country, whether review is discretionary 
or as of right, whether the cases are heard by panels or by the Court as a 
whole, and whether judicial review is based on the constitution, 
legislation, or a decision of the Court.  We’ll then proceed to discuss 
substantive issues such as limitations, if any, on judicial review in each 
of the countries, the pros and cons of such limitations, cases in which 
the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction has been particularly controversial, 
legislation proposed to address some of those problems—particularly in 
Israel but, perhaps, in other countries as well—and a discussion of the 
proper scope of judicial review in a democratic society, a question on 
which there are very strong differences of opinion.  We’ll conclude with 
presentations by Professor Friedmann, Justice Rubinstein, and the 
Honorable Irwin Cotler. 
 
 1 Transcript prepared by Ubiqus/Nation-Wide Reporting & Convention Coverage;  
22 Cortlandt Street, Suite 802, New York, NY 10007. 
 2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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I.     THE COURT 
A.     Structure 
 
So, let me start with the first question.  How are Justices appointed 
to the Supreme Court, how many Justices sit on the Court?  Perhaps we 
can begin with the United States.  Professor Herz, would you briefly 
address that? 
 
1.     The United States 
 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL HERZ3: There are nine Justices on the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  The number is established by Congress, not by 
the Constitution.  The first Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 set the 
number at six.  Six is not an ideal number for a group that decides by 
simple majority voting because you can have three-to-three outcomes, 
but they stuck with six.  Then, I believe, it went up to seven.  During the 
Civil War it went up to ten briefly.  This was partly because of the 
addition of another Circuit but it was mainly to give Abraham Lincoln 
another appointment so that the Court would rule obligingly on some 
pending constitutional issues.  After Lincoln’s assassination when the 
Congress was unhappy with President Johnson, it reduced the number 
of Justices to six or seven, though by attrition, so that Johnson would 
have no appointments.  Once Ulysses S. Grant became President, 
Congress put it back to nine, where it has stayed ever since. 
That history says something to those who would say that Supreme 
Court appointments have been uniquely and unprecedentedly politicized 
in recent years.  We have not gotten to the point, in this or the last 
century, where the U.S. Congress changed the number of Justices in 
order to allow or not allow a President to make an appointment.   
What’s magic about nine?  Nothing really.  Presumably the idea is 
the more the better.  You get better decisions from a larger group, but 
that’s balanced by a kind of unwieldiness that comes with a larger 
group.  The one other thing I would add is something that the Court 
does not do but that has something to do with this question of the 
number of Justices—whether one would imagine a system of 
supermajority voting on the Court, in particular for questions of judicial 
review.  It is sometimes asserted that the Court should only strike down 
a statute when it is absolutely clear that the statute is unconstitutional.  
 
 3 Professor of Law and Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
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That’s an impossible line to draw.  It trades one line drawing problem 
for another.  But one could institutionalize that idea by requiring some 
kind of super majority voting to strike down a statute.  It ties into how 
many Justices are on the Court. 
 
2.     Israel 
 
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN4: The appointment of judges in 
Israel is by a committee of nine: three Supreme Court Justices, two 
government Ministers, two Knesset members, and two appointed by the 
Israeli Bar.  This is the formal composition of the committee and it 
gives the three Justices of the Supreme Court nearly absolute power in 
the nomination process.  How?  There are only three Supreme Court 
Justices on the committee, but you have to take the political process into 
consideration.  The Knesset traditionally selects one member of the 
opposition and one member of the coalition and when it comes to 
nominating judges, especially to the Supreme Court, very often the two 
representatives of the Knesset neutralize one another.5  The two Bar 
representatives—maybe at least one of them, but most of the time both 
of them—support the Supreme Court Justices on the committee.  When 
we speak about the government, the Justice Minister sees himself, most 
of the time—Professor Friedmann was one of the exceptions—not as 
someone who represents the people who elected him but as a 
representative of the Supreme Court.  In one case, the Minister stated 
publicly that the Justices on the committee knew better than he what the 
judicial branch needed so he would follow anything that they decided.  
In such an environment, it is accepted in Israel that you can’t appoint a 
judge, especially a Supreme Court Justice, without the consent of the 
Justices on the committee. 
Recently, we amended the law to provide that appointment of a 
Supreme Court Justice requires seven votes.6  I personally didn’t know 
what to do.  I strongly oppose the present system, but if I voted for the 
amendment it would give veto power to the three Justices.  I was 
convinced to vote for it only for the possibility that in certain situations 
there would be another block on the committee that would have power 
to negotiate. 
These are the dilemmas we have in Israel.  I want to bring one 
example: the nomination of Elyakim Rubinstein—and I don’t want to 
say a bad word about his nomination.  I remember it clearly.  I was a 
 
 4 Israeli Minister of Improvement of Government Services; Member, Knesset. 
 5 This applies to the appointment of all judges. 
 6 Courts Law (Consolidated Version) (Amendment No. 55), 5768-2008, No. 2176, S.H. 813 
(Aug. 6, 2008). 
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member of the committee and it was announced that the Supreme Court 
Justices would vote for him.  The subsequent procedures were like a 
rubber stamp.  Everyone knew that he was going to be nominated.  So, 
the Supreme Court controls judicial appointments in Israel. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN7: Let me begin with a few 
words about our judicial system.  The Israeli judicial system has three 
layers of courts: magistrate courts, district courts, and the Supreme 
Court.  It is, in this respect, a unified system.  There are six district 
courts in the various areas of the country, and there are numerous 
magistrate courts.  The magistrate courts deal with criminal and civil 
matters up to a certain level stipulated by the law, and the family courts 
are part of them too.  Matters beyond that fall under the jurisdiction of 
the district courts, which also serve as administrative courts (in certain 
types of cases against government authorities stipulated by the law), and 
as appellate courts on judgments of the magistrate courts.  The Supreme 
Court serves as a Court of Appeal on judgments of the district courts, in 
criminal, civil, and administrative matters, and as a Court of original 
jurisdiction in general administrative matters (known as High Court of 
Justice cases), and also as a Constitutional Court, dealing with judicial 
review issues.  Israel does not have a full-fledged constitution, but there 
are Basic Laws which have been recognized as constitutional texts, 
relying also on the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel. 
I should add that there are also labor courts, military courts, and 
religious courts of the various denominations (dealing mainly—but not 
exclusively—with marriage and divorce).  All are, in different ways, 
subject to supervision of the Supreme Court, mainly as a High Court of 
Justice. 
The committee for the appointment of judges, now called the 
“selection committee,” was established in 1953 and has been generally 
commended—and, I think, even with some shortcomings, that it was 
rightly praised, and that it is almost as good a system as one could hope 
for.  It consists of nine members—five professionals and four 
politicians.  There are two Knesset members (one traditionally comes 
from the opposition) and two ministers—the committee is chaired by 
the Minister of Justice, which is very important because he or she 
controls the convening of the meetings.  The five professionals are three 
Justices of our Court (who include the President of the Supreme Court 
and two others who rotate on a three-year basis, and who are elected by 
seniority within the Court) and two Bar Association representatives.  
One should remember that when it was established it was perceived as a 
very important achievement compared to places where the Parliament or 
the political system is exclusively involved in the appointment of 
 
 7 Israeli Supreme Court. 
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judges, such as in the United States.  Indeed, the three Justices of the 
Supreme Court constitute an important part of the committee, but that 
doesn’t mean they control the committee.  I should add that there is a 
process of screening by sub-committees—each consists of one Justice, 
one Knesset member, and one Bar Association representative—who 
also interview the candidates for judicial appointments. 
In my view, the best proof of the system’s quality and 
reasonableness is the fact that, historically, there has been a consensus 
that the judiciary has been a success story in terms of the quality of its 
members and decisions.  Of course, some criticize it.  But basically, it 
has been a good system.  Now the question is, what are the alternatives?  
We have a good judiciary—professional and honest.  It is not perfect.  
But it has been a success story.  It would be a pity if it became 
politicized, by—for instance—changing the balance in the selection 
committee, as some suggest. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN8: The system for selecting 
judges was introduced at a time when we did not have judicial review of 
statutes and before the Court expanded its jurisdiction in the way it did.  
It was a completely different legal system.  The assumption was that we 
were concerned with a purely professional body that dealt only with 
civil appeals, criminal appeals, and review of administrative actions—
nothing more.  So the question that arises is whether this method of 
appointing judges should be retained after the Court decided that it also 
has power to review statutes and after the legal system has been 
changed so dramatically.  My view is that it should not.  I think that we 
should change the system in a way that reduces the influence of the 
Supreme Court Justices on the appointments so that we will be able to 
introduce into the Supreme Court judges with somewhat different 
views, backgrounds, and outlooks from those of the Justices that have 
recently dominated the Court or were very influential.  In other words, 
the change in the function of the Court and its jurisdiction must affect 
the way Justices are appointed.  Therefore, during my term as Minister 
of Justice, I supported the change in the law that Minister Eitan 
mentioned—namely, that a majority of seven out of nine members of 
the committee is required in order to elect a Justice to the Supreme 
Court.  Although this change gives the Supreme Court veto power, it 
does not really increase their power since they have had a veto anyway.  
But the new law also gives the politicians a veto, because usually the 
Minister of Justice can get at least three votes; so there is a mutual 
veto.9  I regard this as a temporary situation and I assume that we will 
 
 8 Former Israeli Minister of Justice; Professor (Emeritus) and Former Dean, Tel-Aviv 
University Faculty of Law. 
 9 It seems that the new system had an effect at least in the recent appointment of Justices.  In 
October 2009 (namely after the Conference), three new Justices were appointed to the Supreme 
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have to make additional changes in order to enable the system to reflect 
more divergent approaches in the Supreme Court, which becomes 
crucial when the Supreme Courts gets involved in political and other 
controversial matters. 
MR. NATHAN LEWIN10: An informational question: How are the 
three Justices of the Supreme Court—those who are members of the 
committee—selected?  I think, for example, in terms of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  If there were three Justices who participated in such a 
committee, it would make a big difference how those three Justices 
were selected.  I’m wondering whether the three Justices are simply 
selected at random, which would make it one kind of system, or 
selected by the Chief Justice or the President of Court. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: The President of the Court is 
always there.  So you have two additional Justices and they simply 
rotate.  Their appointments are for three years by seniority.  
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: Also historically, the Chief 
Justices have always been selected by seniority.  That is, when 
somebody retired, the next one in line in terms of seniority would 
become the Chief Justice.  But we don’t know if this will be the 
situation in the future. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Looking at it from the 
American perspective, I find it mind boggling that in Israel 
appointments to the Supreme Court are essentially determined by the 
President of the Supreme Court.  For example, if Justice Warren 
decided who would be on the Court when he was Chief Justice or, 
conversely, if Justice Rehnquist decided who would be on the Court 
when he was Chief Justice, we would have very different Courts than 
we’ve had.  And, while our system may have problems because it is a 
political appointment, it tends to swing back and forth; we get some 
liberal Justices; we get some conservative Justices.  But if the Chief 
Justice can always pick the new Justices on the Court, it seems to me 
the Court will move in one direction only. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: Under the seniority 
system that has hitherto obtained, when the committee elects a new 
Justice to the Supreme Court you already know if he or she is going to 
be the President.  Since we have a compulsory retirement age, namely at 
seventy, all that was required was that the new appointee was younger 
 
Court.  The President of the Supreme Court supported one of them (Uzi Fogelman).  The two 
other Justices that were elected (Neal Handel and Itchak Amit) did not previously serve on a 
temporary appointment on the Supreme Court.  The Justices of the Supreme Court have up to 
now strongly objected to the appointment of a district court judge who was not “tested” in the 
course of a temporary appointment to the Supreme Court.  I strongly objected to this practice and 
I regard the recent appointments as a step in the right direction.  Apparently the Supreme Court 
Justices had to compromise. 
 10 Lewin & Lewin LLP, Washington, D.C. 
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than all the present members of the Court.  I think that this system of 
appointment by seniority is highly problematic.  Whether it will 
continue is not clear.  It is based on tradition and on the committee’s 
complying with the wish of the Supreme Court Justices.  But the 
appointment committee is not bound to follow this tradition.  In 
addition, I initiated a statute that was passed by the Knesset, which may 
lead to a change although it does not directly deal with the issue of 
seniority.  This statute provides in essence that the term of the President 
will not exceed seven years and also that he must have at least another 
three years in office in order to be elected President.11  For example, if 
upon the retirement of the President of the Supreme Court the next 
person in line of seniority is sixty-eight years old, he will not, under the 
new statute, become President, since he will have less than three years 
to serve. 
 
3.     Canada 
 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Mr. Cotler, you told 
me that you changed the Canadian system based partly on the Israeli 
system and rejected other parts of the Israeli system.  Please tell us 
about that. 
MR. IRWIN COTLER12: If somebody had asked me when I was 
appointed Minister of Justice in December of 2003 what my priorities 
were, I would not have included the appointment of Justices amongst 
them.  At the end of my tenure, I was prepared to say that the 
appointment of Justices was the most important thing that the Minister 
of Justice did because that really is the legacy issue.  That determines 
the administration of justice, indeed, the integrity of the administration 
of justice, long after those of us who have the temporary stewardship of 
being Minister of Justice are there. 
There are nine Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada.  Under 
the Supreme Court Act, and to reflect the bi-jural character of the civil 
law and the common law and our geographical diversity, three of the 
Justices must come from the civil law system of Quebec.  The other six 
are from the common law provinces, but they are chosen on a principle 
of diversity of geographical representation.  To that end, three come 
from Ontario, two come from the Western Provinces, and one comes 
from the Atlantic Provinces.   
With respect to the appointments process itself, prior to my 
 
 11 Courts Law (Consolidated Version) (Amendment No. 45), 5767-2007, No. 2103, S.H. 382 
(July 12, 2007). 
 12 Member, Canadian Parliament, Mount Royal; Former Canadian Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General. 
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becoming Minister of Justice, there were two considerations involved.  
First was what might be called respect for the constitutional framework, 
which vested the appointment of Justices in the executive branch of 
government—that is, the Canadian Cabinet.  In effect, it meant the 
Minister of Justice in consultation with the Prime Minister.  The 
practice developed for the Minister of Justice to consult with certain 
other stakeholders, namely the Chief Justice of Canada—and perhaps 
other Justices of the Supreme Court—as well as the Chief Justices of 
the courts of the provinces from which the vacancy arose.  For example, 
if it was from Ontario, then you would consult the Chief Justices of the 
Superior Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal of Ontario.  If it was 
the Western region, then it would be all the Chief Justices in the west.  
In addition, the Minister would seek the opinion of the President of the 
Canadian Bar Association or his or her designee, the President of the 
Provincial Bar Association, and any other people whom it would be 
deemed appropriate to consult.   
The Cabinet of which I became a member was sworn in on 
December 12, 2003.  On that same day, the new Prime Minister, Paul 
Martin, announced that the government would reform the Supreme 
Court appointments process.  That announcement surprised even me, 
although I would be the one to carry it out, because I was not consulted 
beforehand.  While he made clear that the details were up to me, he 
stressed the principle of prior parliamentary involvement in the 
Supreme Court appointment process.  This was a radical change in that 
Canada had never before had parliamentary involvement in judicial 
appointments, whether by way of constitutional or statutory requirement 
or by conventions of practice.  Appointments had been the prerogative 
of the Cabinet. 
Before I could even embark on the reform process, there were two 
further unprecedented developments.  Two sitting Judges of the 
Supreme Court of Canada announced their resignation prior to having to 
do so.  Both resignations were to take effect on June 2004, which meant 
that the reform process had to be dramatically accelerated. 
I promptly appeared before the parliamentary Justice Committee, 
under whose purview the reform process fell.  There, I opened by 
describing the existing protocol for judicial appointments, which had 
not previously been discussed publicly.  Since this protocol had worked 
so well and had remained so admirably unpoliticized, I retained some 
lingering doubts about the need for reform.  Nonetheless, I proceeded to 
outline the criteria I felt should continue to guide the selection process.  
First was the merit principle.  Excellence had to be the overriding 
criteria, alongside consideration of diversity to reflect Canada’s 
multicultural nature.  Second, the integrity of the Supreme Court must 
always be preserved.  In other words, the new process must not damage 
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the reputation of any of the appointees.  Third, promotion and protection 
of the independence of the judiciary.  Fourth, transparency.  Fifth, the 
value of provincial input because of the country’s Federal Constitution.  
And sixth, the value of parliamentary input, which had previously been 
non-existent.   
To make a long story short, the end result of the reforms was a 
four-stage process developed through consultations with Parliament, 
academics, and the judiciary—both domestically and abroad.  In the 
first stage, the Minister of Justice would continue as before to consult 
comprehensively with the actors described above to develop a shortlist 
of five to eight candidates for appointment.  At the second stage, the 
Minister of Justice would appoint a nine-person advisory committee; the 
Israeli model was influential here.  This advisory committee would 
consist of four Members of Parliament, one from each federal party.  It 
would also comprise one retired judge, appointed by the Canadian 
Judicial Council, to represent the views of the judiciary; one 
representative of the provincial Attorney General; and one 
representative from the provincial Bar Association.  This allowance for 
Canada’s federal nature was a departure from the American and Israeli 
models.  In Canada, we are required by law to draw upon regional and 
provincial perspectives.  Finally, the advisory committee allowed for 
public input, inviting suggestions of candidates through major 
newspapers.  Interestingly, the recommendations received actually 
dovetailed with the ultimate appointees.  The public was better informed 
than one might think on these matters.  The third stage involved 
comprehensive consultation by the advisory committee with respect to 
the same criteria as had always informed the process, as a result of 
which the advisory committee would provide the Minister of Justice 
with a shortlist of three people drawn from the Minister’s original list of 
five to eight.  In the fourth stage, the Minister of Justice in consultation 
with the Prime Minister would make the executive appointment from 
that short list. 
Almost as soon as we had articulated this process, a third Justice of 
the Supreme Court announced he was stepping down, having come to 
the mandatory retirement age.  However, just as we came to the fourth 
and final step in choosing his replacement, an election intervened and it 
was left for the next government to make the ultimate decision.    
Following the election, I spoke to the incoming Minister of Justice 
and advised him as to my choice from among the shortlisted names.  
Fortuitously, the new Minister agreed, and Justice Rothstein was 
appointed.  Interestingly, we already at that point had two Jewish 
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Morris Fish and 
Justice Rosalie Abella.  This would have been the third Jewish Justice 
of the nine.  In a way, I felt, it was better that I not be the one to make 
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that appointment. 
As for the reformed appointments process, before finalizing the 
appointment of Justice Rothstein, the new government made one 
addition, influenced by the American approach.  I had opted not to 
include a public hearing before a parliamentary committee since I felt it 
might invite a politicized process.  But I came around because the new 
government’s approach to the hearing involved certain ground rules 
with respect to the kinds of questions that could be asked and was 
presided over by the most distinguished constitutional law professor in 
Canada, Peter Hogg.  There were no questions really asked about the 
personal belief systems of the candidate.  It was very professional.  The 
hearing was intended to be less adversarial than the American 
procedure, and that was because our Constitution is also different from 
that of the United States; Canada’s Constitution does not require the 
consent of Parliament.  The four-stage process that I formulated gave 
Parliament an advisory role only.  So that made for a more conciliatory 
hearing.   
In sum, this major change to Canada’s appointment process was 
not uninfluenced by the practices in Israel and the United States. 
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: Minister Cotler, under the new process, 
did you consult with sitting members of the Canadian Supreme Court?  
I would love to hear what Judge Posner would say about all this, 
because to somebody in the American system, with the separation of 
powers, it would almost be scandalous for the President in appointing a 
Supreme Court Justice to be consulting with sitting Supreme Court 
Justices. 
MR. IRWIN COTLER: Not only did I consult with the sitting 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with regard to appointments, but I 
also made it public that the Minister of Justice does consult with the 
Chief Justice and could consult with other members of the Supreme 
Court.  I consulted with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and 
through the Chief Justice I sought, as best as possible, the views of the 
Court.  It was left up to her to make that determination as to who she 
would consult and how she would convey it to me.  In sum, in Canada 
there is a judicial contribution to the process.  But the judicial 
contribution has to be seen as part of the larger advisory process. 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH13: Minister Cotler has taken such care in 
outlining the current procedure so that you’ll realize how fortunate I am 
to have been appointed under the previous system.  My question is, 
Minister Cotler, in the half century prior to my appointment, has there 
been criticism of even a single appointee? 
MR. IRWIN COTLER: As discussed, March 2004 saw the first-
 
 13 Canadian Supreme Court. 
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ever parliamentary hearings in connection with a judicial appointment.  
Then, as in previous appointment processes, I was not aware of any 
public criticism of an appointee on either political or ideological 
grounds.  That may be a product of the political culture in Canada.  
People would have felt it might somehow diminish the integrity of the 
Court, its perceived excellence, if it were to be politicized.  
Interestingly, in the appointments in which I was involved, we used a 
confidentiality agreement.  Everyone whom I consulted as Justice 
Minister would enter into a written confidentiality agreement as to the 
consultations.  There was never any breach of the confidentiality 
agreement.  I am not sure this would have been the case in other 
political cultures, including that of Israel.  Confidentiality was always 
observed and I think that was an important part of why the process was 
able to work. 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER14: You know there’s an analogy in 
the United States.  President Carter appointed advisory commissions to 
advise on appointment of federal court of appeals judges, and they were 
a fake.  Elaborate search processes usually are phony.  That is to say, 
the person who comes out at the other end is the person who would 
have been picked anyway.  President Carter wanted to give the 
impression of consultation, promote diversity, and bring some laymen 
into the process.  So there were laymen on his commissions, who would 
ask goofy questions of the candidates.  It was part of an obsession with 
process, an obsession that seems to be part of modern democratic 
government.  I don’t think it has any benefits.  I think that Frankfurter in 
1939 was the first Supreme Court nominee—or probably any federal 
judicial nominee—who had an oral hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  Initially the hearings were perfunctory, but gradually they 
became more searching, involved a deeper background search, and so 
on, and some people who lacked professional qualifications, like Harriet 
Miers, whom you recall President Bush tried to put on the Supreme 
Court, got excluded because of the enhanced procedures.  But I don’t 
think the Supreme Court has improved over what it was before. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Since I will become kind of 
the defender of our system here, with my two colleagues having 
different views, let me just add as an informational point, that the 
candidates have been suggested either by the Minister of Justice or by 
the Chief Justice or by any three members of the committee. 
This used to be a secret and also the names of the candidates.  Now 
this has been amended.  Now the names are made public thirty days 
before the committee convenes.  So anybody who has anything to say 
can do so before the appointment.  For instance, when I was appointed, 
 
 14 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
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there were people who wrote to the committee.  The committee sent me 
the material and asked me to comment on it.  The best proof, I think, 
that the system is not “controlled” by the Justices, although they do 
have a very important weight, is that Minister Friedmann has been able 
to appoint two practicing lawyers from the private sector to the Court, 
which was unprecedented, except for during the very beginning of the 
Court. 
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON15: I wouldn’t exaggerate the 
notion in the United States that the Justices aren’t involved because a 
retiring Justice always, unless they’re incompetent, pays a courtesy call 
on the President to inform him about the retirement before it happens 
and those conversations don’t infrequently involve the question “is there 
anyone you would particularly recommend.”  Now, in the United States, 
though having had that conversation, the President is perfectly capable 
of ignoring every name and there are documented cases where the 
President has ignored suggestions by a Justice.  So, some Justices are at 
least a voice in the process, but they can be ignored and have been 
ignored.  I think that the big difference between the procedures you’re 
describing in Israel and the United States is that here interest groups are 
capable of capturing the appointment process.   In the Bush 
Administration, it was common knowledge that the Federalist Society 
was the primary vetter of appointees and that one person in the 
Federalist Society was the primary individual.  So I’m going to disagree 
with Judge Posner.  I think that these procedures can be important if for 
no other reason than you can’t have one entity in Washington 
controlling the string of names that’s given to the President.  The one 
break in the Bush Administration in which they did not follow the 
procedure that we all knew was going on otherwise was Harriet Miers, 
which the President did without consultation with the Federalist Society 
and she came down.  So I think that the American system is not quite as 
removed from the Justices as it might seem but I also think that it’s 
perfectly capable of capture.  We’ve just been through eight years where 
it was pretty clear. 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: There have been times in the United 
States when a Chief Justice was consulted by or thrust his views on the 
White House.  Chief Justice Taft was very aggressive in trying to make 
sure that no liberals got on the Supreme Court; and I think Chief Justice 
Burger must have been the person who suggested Blackmun as an 
appointment by Nixon.  I can’t imagine where else Blackmun’s name 
would come from.  But the idea of picking one’s successors is I think 
very questionable.  So it’s a strength of the United States that we 
generally don’t have that practice. 
 
 15 Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
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PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: I want to add my insight 
as a politician.  The main lesson that comes out from our system is that 
in order to get a seat on the Supreme Court, or even on the lower courts, 
you should be loyal to the system.  The question is not whether you are 
more qualified, because to everybody in Israel it is clear that anybody 
who seeks a seat on the Supreme Court must be loyal to a particular 
ideology.  No jurist who was against judicial activism had, at least up to 
now, even a slight chance to get the seat.  So the nomination method in 
Israel is part of judicial activism and it serves that policy—and we have 
to change it. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: What’s your alternative? 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: My alternative is to reduce 
the number of Supreme Court Justices on the Committee or to add a 
member of Parliament and also an academician elected by the 
Presidents of the Israeli universities. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Let me then add, that in my 
book, Judges of the Country,16 which came out back in 1980, I praised 
our system for selecting judges (including Supreme Court Justices) 
through a selection committee, which had been introduced, as I 
mentioned before, via legislation in 1953 as an original Israeli 
contribution.  It is a balanced system, giving the non-political people the 
majority within the nine-person committee, while the four political 
members are the minority.17  I do not think a change is necessary; I still 
believe that the system is fine. 
MR. IRWIN COTLER: Just to comment on what Judge Posner 
said, namely that the Justices appointed at the end of the reformed 
process we introduced would have been the same ones appointed 
without the process.  I think that is true. 
Simply because there was agitation for the process to be reformed 
coming from the opposition—at the time, a conservative opposition 
ideologically somewhat like the Republican ideology in the United 
States—on the ground that the original process was secretive.  
Journalists, too, demanded that it be opened up.  Academics demanded 
that it be opened up and the then-Prime Minister, my boss, wanted it 
opened up.  So, reform was inevitable, and while I believe we would 
have the same two Justices as a result of the original process, the 
reformed process gave those Justices greater validation.   
One footnote: After the appointment of Justice Abella, a journalist 
came to see me and asked about Justice Abella because, by some in the 
 
 16 ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN, SHOFTEY ERETZ [JUDGES OF THE COUNTRY] (1980). 
 17 Let me also add, that after this Conference was held, three new Justices were appointed by 
consent from among the district court judges.  Only one of them served before as an acting Justice 
on the Supreme Court, and not all of them may have initially been supported by all of the Justices 
on the committee.  See supra note 9. 
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configuration of constituencies consulted, she was deemed to be 
somewhat of a controversial figure.  The journalist said to me, “I 
understand that you’re a friend of Justice Abella.”  I said, “No, not just a 
friend, a very good friend.  But then again if you want to eliminate all of 
the people with whom I am friendly, including all my former students, 
you’d have to exclude a lot of people from the appointment process.”  
Then he said, “I understand that Justice Abella is Jewish, and you’re 
Jewish.”  He asked whether that had been an issue.  I replied that I had 
considered the matter, specifically in light of our Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  Section 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion.  I 
was obliged by the Constitution not to take religion into consideration.  
At that point he said to me, “Well, I guess I don’t have a story.”  I said, 
“Well, no, you do have a story.  Not the story that you came in to write, 
but you have the whole appointments process.”  I should note that, at 
the outset, he had asked if he could tape the interview.  I said yes, and 
noted that I would be taping it as well.  At the end of the exchange I 
said, “You see that tape?  I’m just going to go ahead and have that tape 
reproduced so that people can understand the exchange that took place.”  
He said, “You wouldn’t do that, would you?”  I said, “Why not?  
You’ve taped it.  You could do it.  I can do it.  I’m going to put it out.”  
To sum it up, the person resigned as a journalist within ten days. 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: My experience has been—in this and in 
related matters—that one must take care in attempting to implant into 
one’s own system a procedure that appears to have worked well in 
another jurisdiction.  I found that out early at a conference at NYU 
where we talked about American judges and Canadian judges.  Some of 
them were elected.  And to the American judges, the notion that I was 
appointed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice was equally 
troublesome.  So we have to take great care.  I want to say that Minister 
Cotler is to be commended for both heeding advice and anticipating 
concerns in modifying the process for appointing Justices to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  He took a very balanced approach and 
sought to learn from both the Israeli and American processes without 
losing sight of the fact that Canada has a different appointment 
tradition. 
 
B.     Scope of Review 
 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM:  The next series of 
questions: Does the Court sit in panels or as a whole?  If it sits in panels, 
how many Justices are on a panel and how are they selected?  Can cases 
be brought directly to the Supreme Court?  Does the Court have 
discretion whether to take a case, and if yes, what are the criteria? 
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1.     Canada 
 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: In most cases the full Court sits.  
However, five Justices constitute a quorum18 and from time to time, 
seven or five will sit.  A panel of five is rare, and occurs typically in a 
case of an as of right appeal, for example where there has been a dissent 
on a question of law in the Court of Appeal in a criminal matter.  So in 
those cases there will sometimes be only five.  Sometimes the dissent 
may flag an important question and although five Justices can hear the 
appeal, the Chief Justice may instead empanel all nine. 
How is the panel selected?  Since all nine Justices sit in most cases 
there is no difficulty.  In other cases, the Chief Justice will select the 
panel.  Sometimes, one of the Justices—for one reason or another—will 
be unable to sit.  For example, if the Justice was part of the panel in the 
Court of Appeal that decided the matter now appealed to the Supreme 
Court, that Justice cannot sit.  That is pursuant to the Supreme Court 
Act.19  Any Justice of the Court not already assigned to sit has the right 
to request that he or she form part of the panel and such a request—
however rare—will generally be accommodated by the Chief Justice. 
Cases apart from the criminal appeal exception that I mentioned 
and the Reference jurisdiction, which I will explain in a moment, can 
come to the Court only with leave of the Court.  We receive about 700 
applications for leave annually.  The leave applications are distributed 
among three separate panels of three Justices each.  The three Justices 
on that panel will study the file and make a recommendation to the other 
two members of the panel.  However, all Justices have an opportunity to 
raise an issue concerning leave.  I would therefore emphasize that 
although the final decision is that of the three Justices who are seized of 
the application, the decision of those three will be circulated to the 
others who may comment on the panel’s provisional decision.  On this 
point, I don’t want to get into the technicalities of the process.  I would 
simply say that at a monthly conference of the Court, any Justice who 
feels that a panel has overlooked an issue of importance, or 
alternatively, that there are other cases that have recently been decided 
on the same point, is free to draw that to the panel’s attention.  Now I’m 
told that in the United States, Judge Posner, there is a rule of four.  Is 
that correct? 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: That’s correct. 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: So in our system there is no firm rule of 
four, but if there is a strong sentiment to hear an appeal, the panel will 
 
 18 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 25 (1985). 
 19 Id. § 28(1). 
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normally accommodate that desire in its vote.  The thought is that since 
the applications are divided on a random basis, it would be unfortunate 
if a litigant who would have had this one last opportunity to be heard if 
the application for leave had gone to another panel, is by the rule of 
chance, excluded. 
I mentioned that the Supreme Court of Canada has another 
jurisdiction and this might seem a bit odd to American ears.  Section 53 
of the Supreme Court Act provides that the Governor-in-Council—
essentially the Cabinet—can refer any question to the Court.  Generally, 
this will take the form of a proposed statute, but this is not always the 
case.  Whether the Court is obliged to pronounce on all aspects of the 
question is an issue that has been raised before the Court.  In fact, the 
Court has said that it is not bound to do so.20  Notably, this was 
articulated in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference21 and the Quebec 
Secession Reference.22  In fact, the very power of reference itself was 
held to be constitutionally permissible in the Reference re References in 
1912.23 
What are the criteria applied in granting leave?  The criteria are set 
out in Section 43 of the Supreme Court Act.  The question is whether 
the application for leave raises an issue of public importance or involves 
an issue which is otherwise important.  The distinction between the two 
is that a question may not be of truly national importance, but it may be 
quite important in a particular field of law.  Moreover, the statute has a 
wonderful concluding catch-all phrase that states that if the Court for 
any purpose deems that the matter is one which warrants a decision by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, we are empowered by the statute to take 
it. 
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: How many cases do you consider 
each year? 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: We hear generally about the same 
number as the Supreme Court of the United States, perhaps a few more.  
Approximately eighty a year. 
 
 20 See, e.g., Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 768 (Can.), 
available at http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1981/1981scr1-753/1981scr1-753.html. 
 21 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.), available at 
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2004/2004scc79/2004scc79.pdf. 
 22 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), available at 
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998scr2-217/1998scr2-217.html. 
 23 Reference re References by Governor-General in Council, [1910] 43 S.C.R. 536, aff’d, 
[1912] A.C. 571 (Can.). 
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2.     The United States 
 
PROFESSOR ELIZABETH DEFEIS24: The answer to the question 
of whether the Supreme Court sits in panels in the United States is quite 
simply, “no.”  The Court does not sit in panels, but it does require a 
minimum of six Justices in order to hear oral arguments and to decide a 
case.  Often this quorum is not met because of illnesses of Justices or 
because of conflicts of interest of Justices. 
One recent case that came up to the U.S. Supreme Court, and was 
greatly anticipated by international lawyers, was brought under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act.  It involved a claim based upon aiding and 
abetting the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the question was 
whether or not that case could be decided by the federal district court.25  
Ultimately, the case went to the Supreme Court, but the Court was 
unable to decide the case.  Because the litigation involved many 
corporations as parties, a number of Justices recused themselves, and 
the Court did not have a quorum.  So we are still waiting for a proper 
case to come to the Court in order for the Court to decide the question. 
Does the Court have discretion whether to take a case?  Since 
1988, the Court has almost unfettered authority with respect to the kinds 
of cases that it will take.  Previously, under mandatory jurisdiction, the 
Court was required to take cases in certain categories, for example, 
when a state court held a federal law invalid, or a state law valid under a 
challenge to federal law.  Congress revised the rules in 1988, so that 
now, with few exceptions, the only route to the Supreme Court is by 
petition for certiorari.  There are about 10,000 cases per year that come 
to the Court through this method, and the Court must decide whether or 
not it will grant certiorari.  Indeed, it takes only about 100 cases a year 
out of that great number.  The criteria for the Court’s current method 
was stated quite well by Justice Rehnquist: The case must first raise a 
federal question to which different courts had given conflicting answers, 
or cases in which an appellate court decided a case in conflict with 
governing Supreme Court precedent.26  Of course, one must satisfy the 
Court’s jurisdictional requirements, for example, that the parties have 
standing.  Then the Court has wide discretion with respect to deciding 
which cases it will accept through the certiorari route, usually cases 
 
 24 Professor of Law and Former Dean, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 25 Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (denying cert because the Court 
lacked a quorum, 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); since a majority of the qualified Justices were of the 
opinion that the case could not be heard, affirming the judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006), 
which provides that under these circumstances the Court shall enter its order affirming the 
judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as an 
affirmance by an equally divided Court). 
 26 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 224-38 (2001). 
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which it deems most important and should be authoritatively decided by 
the highest Court. 
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: Back in the days when Judge Posner and 
I clerked for Justices on the Supreme Court, in the 1960s, the Supreme 
Court decided approximately 150 cases a term.  Now there are twice as 
many law clerks per Justice but they decide only half as many cases.  
They decide seventy-five cases per term. 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: Are the opinions three times as long? 
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: The writing may be substantially longer.  
But in those days, each Chamber—both the law clerk and the Justice—
would read the petitions for certiorari and review them themselves.  
Now it is an open secret that there is a “cert pool” so that one 
memorandum is written for at least seven of the Justices and the Justices 
themselves do not read the petitions.  Justice Alito, I’m told, has now 
withdrawn from the cert pool.  Justice Stevens was never in the cert 
pool, but all the other Justices rely on the summary that’s written by one 
law clerk of the many law clerks that the Supreme Court has. 
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON: Actually it has been broken 
down to two.  There are two cert pools in the Court right now out of 
those seven Justices.  I clerked from 1989-1990, and at that time we 
were writing memos for four Justices and we had about 7000 cases 
coming in.  There are 13,000 cases coming into the Court right now and 
the Court is taking about seventy-five.  So a lot of the petitions are just 
scanned and thrown aside. 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: It is an extraordinary paradox.  
Usually you think that if the inputs into some production process 
increase in quantity and quality, the output will increase in quantity or 
quality.  So as Mr. Lewin said, in the olden days, the 1960s, Supreme 
Court Justices had only two law clerks, most of whom came directly 
from law school; and now they each have four or five law clerks who 
have clerked for at least a year for another judge and have been more 
carefully screened (in part because there is more competition to become 
a Supreme Court law clerk) and often have more extensive experience.  
And the cert pool has economized on the time of law clerks.  Yet 
despite all that, the number of cases the Court decides has greatly 
diminished.  The opinions are somewhat longer, they’re more learned, 
they’re more polished in a professional sort of way, but I don’t think 
anyone really thinks the Supreme Court is better than it was forty years 
ago.  It’s different.  If you’re a conservative, you like it more now; if 
you’re a liberal, you don’t.  But it’s not improved.  It seems that in 
government you can keep adding procedures, personnel, and so on, and 
yet you don’t actually get any additional social product. 
 2412 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:6 
 
3.     Israel 
 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: I envy the U.S. and the 
Canadian systems.  Eighty cases a year is great.  We in the Israeli 
Supreme Court are like latter day slaves.  Except for not actually having 
a chain on my leg, my colleagues and I are basically in that situation.  
Last year we finished with over 11,000 cases.  We are at this point 
twelve Justices.  We could be up to fifteen, but there was haggling and 
controversy and then elections, so there were no appointments in the 
last year, year-and-a-half.27  We sit basically in panels of three, which is 
the regular rule.  That is in criminal, civil, or administrative law cases.  
In most of the cases we do not have the option of not taking them 
because they are appeals from the district courts on criminal or civil or 
administrative law cases which started there, and which we have to take.  
There are cases heard in a one-person panel, mainly detentions, 
injunctions, and leave requests.  We have Justices on Call, two each 
month, and they take many cases which are detentions, injunctions, or 
stays, and a major part of their work is a one-person panel.  Since 
legislation passed back in 1996, every detention case can be brought by 
right, not by leave, to the Supreme Court.  Of course, not all of them are 
brought, but many are.  So, for instance, I was Justice on Call in 
December 2008 and then in March 2009; for the two months together, I 
had to conduct over 150 hearings in detention cases.  Many of them 
shouldn’t be on the docket of the Supreme Court, but they are there by 
law.  That is besides the regular workload done in the panels of three.  
We sit in bigger panels in matters of special importance, usually the 
three original Justices and whoever has been added.  The composition 
of the larger panel is decided by the President of the Court or her 
deputy.  So in such cases, the panel could be enlarged to five, seven, 
nine, or even eleven or thirteen if it’s a constitutional case.  
Constitutional cases, in the last fourteen years, have always been 
decided by large panels.  I will come to them later. 
We do have partial discretion in deciding whether to take certain 
cases—it is very limited.  That is in the request for leave if a case has 
already gone through the two levels of law courts—magistrate and 
district courts.  But if it began in the district court, we don’t have the 
option to deny a hearing.  And, unlike the American tradition, for 
instance, where the Supreme Court writes “cert denied” without further 
explanation, in our system the tradition is that you explain why you do 
not grant leave.  This decision is not a precedent, but many lawyers use 
it in later cases as if it were. 
 
 27 Three more justices were appointed in October 2009. 
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The leave request is dealt with by one Justice.  If the Justice thinks 
it is worth bringing to a hearing, he will refer it to a panel.  I myself deal 
with many leave requests as a third layer in civil cases, and most of 
them are rejected but with an explanation.   
The most prominent issues in the public eye are of the Supreme 
Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, known as Bagatz (Beit 
Mishpat Gavo’ha Le’Tzedek).  These are administrative law issues of 
original jurisdiction coming to the Supreme Court.  Over the years, the 
request for standing or locus standi was abolished by judicial decisions.  
When I was in law school, in the late 1960s—ancient history—we were 
taught that you are supposed to show standing when you want to bring a 
case to the High Court of Justice.  Over the years, for various reasons, 
including the wish to give the public better access to the Court in 
administrative matters, and also to provide access to Palestinians from 
the territories administered by Israel, the Court has basically abolished 
the “standing” requirement. 
The High Court of Justice cases come first to the Justice on Call.  
He or she will decide whether to request—and usually does request—a 
response from the relevant government agency, and they respond.  
Sometimes it’s urgent, certainly in human rights issues.  Urgent cases 
could be heard even on the same day or the next day.  Sometimes I’m 
called by the Court registrar, asking if I can sit at six in the afternoon 
that very day on a panel.  In some cases, though, we would decide that 
there is no justification for a hearing and we would dismiss the case by 
a three Justices panel written decision.  The “regular” cases are brought 
to a hearing. 
The Court has been criticized for judicial activism.  Let me say that 
having served, inter alia, as attorney general, government secretary, and 
legal adviser to two ministries, that in having been for many years in 
government positions, I expressed my views on it in former incarnations 
and I can say it now also as a Justice of the Court.  From the public 
point of view of better government, if you balance between the huge 
volume of cases which the Court took and decided on one hand, and the 
controversial issues for which it is criticized on the other hand, I have 
no doubt that the benefit to the public over the years by the Court is by 
far greater than the controversy on some issues which sometimes I 
myself would have thought could be approached otherwise.  To sum up: 
The Court’s work is indeed very heavy, and it could be reduced by 
legislation.  But it is not the “judicial activism” which creates the 
problem.  And indeed, many of the Court’s critics are themselves 
submitting High Court petitions to it time and again.  Finally, in 
response to Mr. Eitan: I have been a supporter—in fact, an enthusiast—
for many years of the existing appointments system.  In fact, as I 
mentioned before, I was one of the first to write on it in 1980 in Judges 
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of the Country,28 the first book written—I believe—on the history of our 
Court. 
 
4.     Direct Review by the High Court: Israel’s Unique Process  
 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Have the cases 
brought to the High Court ever been heard by another court? 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Basically, the answer is no, 
definitely as far as courts from the general system, whose decisions are 
subject to appeal.  The High Court of Justice cases are original 
jurisdiction and they’re brought right to the Supreme Court.  There are 
some administrative law cases which go first to the district courts in 
their administrative capacity.  But the basic High Court of Justice 
original jurisdiction is widely used.  One of the Justices once wrote that 
a new custom has emerged—somebody reads a newspaper article and 
says “oh, come on, let’s go up to Zion and I’ll put in a petition.”  But 
many cases are of importance, and render a great service to the public, 
to which I can attest—as I mentioned before—as a former government 
civil servant.  I should add, though, that some of the High Court 
petitions concern decisions of religious courts or labor courts, where 
there is no appeal to the Supreme Court.  The judicial policy of 
intervention in these cases is very restrained. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: If I’m correct, neither 
the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Canadian Supreme Court has that 
process where people can come directly and petition the Court. 
MR. NATHAN LEWIN: There are original cases in the U.S. 
Supreme Court from ambassadors and most importantly states suing 
other states.  When that happens, they get a special master who 
essentially functions as a district court judge to have a trial. 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: But am I correct in assuming that the 
Bagatz process involves a lawsuit against the government or some 
government agency? 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: It is a private party against 
the government.  The petitioners are arguing that some right was 
violated by the government or one of its agencies. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: I just want to 
emphasize, if I understand it correctly, that Israel is unique in this 
respect, that anybody who thinks that anything was done wrong by the 
government can simply go to the Supreme Court, bring a case and have 
it heard at that time. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: Yes.  I will just give you an 
 
 28 RUBINSTEIN, supra note 16. 
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example.  Recently, during the Gaza operation (in December 2008-
January 2009), there were four petitions to the Court relating to the 
military operations.  By chance I sat on all four of them (the panel is 
randomly decided).  Like in other cases, there was a dialogue in the 
courtroom between the government and the Court about whether some 
of the government modes of behavior on a certain issue would be 
modified or improved.  Those petitions related to humanitarian supplies, 
medical assistance, access to the media, and even the conduct of 
elections in one of the Israeli towns adjacent to the Gaza area.  So it’s 
common practice. 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: Just let me ask again who determines 
the size and composition of the panels.  When there’s a petition for 
rehearing from three members, and as I understand it goes up to five or 
seven or nine or eleven, who makes the decision as to who are the 
members of the larger panel? 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: In that rare case, it’s either 
the President or the Deputy.  It’s not random.  The three original 
Justices would be on and the additional Justices usually would be 
designated by seniority, but the President or her Deputy would still have 
discretion.  In some rare cases it would be a larger panel from the 
beginning. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: The problems that the 
Supreme Court faces now result from the fact that originally the Israeli 
Supreme Court was thought to be simply a Court of Appeal, and this 
was its main function.  There was the additional function inherited from 
the British mandate of receiving direct applications against the 
administration, but their number was relatively small.  However, the 
Court’s policy of expanding its jurisdiction and abolishing the standing 
requirement has greatly increased the number of cases that the Supreme 
Court is required to deal with.  In other words, the Court developed 
rules that greatly increase its load and it now complains about the 
burden.  By the way, the Minister of Justice is empowered to transfer 
these kinds of direct applications to the district court sitting as an 
administrative court and we do it usually only if the Supreme Court asks 
us to do so.  Yet, the Supreme Court wants to keep those cases that are 
in the media, that attract attention and are important.  It wants to keep 
this original jurisdiction and we allow it to keep it.  The burden that 
ensues is the result of the Court’s policy. 
A related matter is that the Israeli Supreme Court—which 
originally was and still is a Court of Appeal—is trying to turn itself into 
a constitutional court, and they look at the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Canadian Supreme Court with great envy and say well, we want to sit as 
a panel of nine judges, we want to be able to select our cases and no 
longer remain a Court of Appeal.  That is what they want and they have 
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been lobbying for it for a long time.  But I think that on the political 
level people see it differently and consider that one way to deal with the 
burden is to appoint more Justices to the Supreme Court; but the 
Justices on the Court object to it.  They don’t want it.  I think that 
Minister Eitan when he chaired the committee in Parliament wanted to 
increase the number of Supreme Court Justices.  President Barak 
resisted this very strongly.  He said no, we don’t want more Justices; we 
want less work.  Eventually they reached a compromise of fifteen 
Justices, which was already an increase in the number of Justices that 
had been on the Court before.  We started with five Justices when the 
State of Israel was established, then the number was increased to nine.  
Now we have fifteen Justices and I think Parliament would be willing to 
increase the number further.  The Court resists this strongly.  The 
current Justices do not want to have a Supreme Court based on the 
continental model where you have many more Justices.  They have the 
American model in mind, and that’s one of the conflicts that we have. 
Justice Rubinstein spoke about a Justice on Call.  I look at this as a 
“Justice without control.”  What happens if the Court accepts thousands 
of applications by applicants who have no standing and if everything is 
justiciable?  What kind of litigation is it and what is the effect of this 
kind of litigation?  This led to the situation that was described by Justice 
Cheshin in the following words: 
In an exaggerated way we can say that nowadays [when] a person 
takes into his hands a newspaper . . . his eyes glance over the news 
until his eye catches a particular item.  Having found what he found 
he calls upon his friends: Let us rise and go up to Zion—to the 
Supreme Court.  He speaks and acts.  An application [is submitted] 
as if written in the course of the trip [to Jerusalem] . . . .29 
In the lines that follow, Justice Cheshin protests against such 
applications that lack sufficient facts to sustain them.  But applications 
based mainly on facts publicized by the media are regularly submitted 
to the Supreme Court and the policy adopted by the Court actually 
encourages the practice.  No costs are imposed on the applicant who 
files a groundless petition in the “public interest.”  From the applicant’s 
point of view this is a win-win situation.  Even if the petition is 
dismissed it usually gets publicity—which more than compensates him 
for his trouble. 
 Moreover, the Court gets the application and sometimes even if it 
lacks sufficient basis the Court calls the government, as Justice 
Rubinstein mentioned; the Court thus opens a dialogue with the 
government.  But this kind of “dialogue” is backed by a potential order 
of the Court.  In reality, the Court intervenes in the discretion of the 
 
 29 HCJ 2148/94 Gelbart v. Chairman of the Investigating Committee for the Examination of 
the Massacre in Hebron [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 573, 600 (translation from Hebrew). 
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executive and in the way the government is governing the country.  The 
Court is replacing the executive.  So it is not only a technical issue.  It is 
a process that upsets the checks and balances between the branches of 
government. 
 
II.     THE BASIS OF AND LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: The next questions 
concern the basis of and limitations on judicial review.  First, is judicial 
review based on the constitution, on legislation, or on a decision of the 
Court?  Second, are there limitations, such as standing, the political 
question doctrine, or others? 
 
A.     The United States 
 
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON: There’s a combination of 
bases in the United States.  There’s jurisdiction stated explicitly in 
Article III of the Constitution, but there’s also, of course, Marbury v. 
Madison, which is the Supreme Court decision that states that the 
Supreme Court will have the last word on interpreting constitutional 
provisions.30  Not that it will be the only body but it will have the last 
word in interpreting constitutional provisions, which is, of course, a 
rather large grab for power which has turned out to be pretty successful 
for the Court.  It is the last word in the United States even, for example, 
when the question is who is the President of the United States.31  We 
have a number of limitations that are placed on cases.  Some of them 
come out of what’s called the case or controversy requirement.  The 
Supreme Court and the federal courts are not permitted to issue advisory 
opinions.  There must be both a dispute and there must be individuals 
who have standing.  They can’t file just generalized grievances.  They 
must show they have some kind of interest at stake.  They must show 
that the Court can solve the problem; and there are both constitutional 
and prudential reasons that keep cases out of federal court; and then 
there is a requirement of ripeness.  The issue must be ready for the 
Court to hear.  The Courts will not take cases, in the federal system at 
least, until the dispute is sufficiently ripe or well developed so that the 
Court can decide it based on facts as opposed to just bare theory. 
Then there are limits that are related to keeping the dual 
sovereignty of the federal government and the state government.  One is 
 
 30 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 31 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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that federal courts will not decide issues solely based on state law as a 
general matter and that means that the states must be the deciders of 
most state law issues.  That means the states continue to have the 
primary role in the interpretation of state law.  Federal courts will defer 
to state courts on the interpretation of state law.  So, if the U.S. Supreme 
Court gets a case in which there is a pivotal state law question, the 
Court will send it back to the state supreme court to tell it what the state 
law means and then it will decide the federal aspects of the law.  
Additionally, there’s the political question doctrine.  For example, the 
U.S. Constitution guarantees to the states a republican form of 
government.  This was just another element of the U.S. Constitution that 
rejected direct democracy.  The theory is that there are not supposed to 
be direct democracies at either the state or federal level, but the 
Supreme Court has refused to hear those cases saying they’re political 
questions about the order of government that a state chooses and the 
Court will not get involved.  The result has been that we have had a 
rather widespread development of direct democracy in certain states. 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Let me register a minor 
disagreement with Professor Hamilton.  I don’t think it’s correct that 
Marbury v. Madison represented a power grab, a mere assertion of the 
power of judicial review.  That makes Chief Justice Marshall sound like 
Chief Justice Barak.  The Constitution says that the Constitution and 
laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and that 
means that the Constitution is law and it was already well established in 
England and in the Colonies that if you have two conflicting laws and 
one is hierarchically superior to the other, the higher preempts the lower 
law.  So if, for example, an act of Parliament was inconsistent with a 
local law in England, then the local law was invalid; or if a Colonial law 
was inconsistent with an act of Parliament, that local law was invalid.  
Thus the Colonial courts and the English courts already were 
invalidating laws.  All this is explained in a great, recent book by Philip 
Hamburger, a professor at Columbia Law School.32  What obscures 
recognition of the point is that in the traditional British system, acts of 
Parliament were regarded as part of the British Constitution.  The 
British Constitution isn’t a single document.  It’s a collection.  It 
includes laws enacted by Parliament, along with the Magna Carta, 
certain customs, and certain judicial decisions.  Because acts of 
Parliament were of constitutional dignity, the British courts could not 
invalidate them.   But the act of Parliament as a constitutional 
undertaking corresponds to the U.S. Constitution.   The U.S. 
Constitution can be used to invalidate other laws, but what’s interesting 
and emphasized by Professor Hamilton, is that the judiciary created by 
 
 32 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); see also Richard A. Posner, 
Modesty and Power, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 2008, at 38 (reviewing Hamburger’s book). 
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Article III of the Constitution is modeled very closely on the English 
courts of the eighteenth century, and those courts conceived their 
function as procedurally rather narrow.  They just entertained cases.  
They didn’t have “abstract review.”  They thus weren’t anything like 
the modern Israeli Supreme Court.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has a 
secure power to invalidate federal statutes as well as all sorts of 
administrative and executive acts and state statutes and so on, there 
must be something quite like a conventional litigation in order to 
empower the Supreme Court to exercise its power of invalidation. 
PROFESSOR MARCI HAMILTON: With respect to Judge 
Posner’s point, I don’t think it’s inconsistent to say that the Supreme 
Court was engaging in a grab for power.  Whether it was history or not, 
the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly give the power to the Court and 
the Court took it. 
 
B.     Canada 
 
MR. IRWIN COTLER: In Canada, the power of judicial review 
wasn’t solicited by the courts but imposed upon them—specifically, in 
its modern iteration, by two provisions in our Constitution Act.  Section 
52 of the Act provides that “[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme 
law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or 
effect.”33  In addition, there is a provision of the Charter of Rights—one 
element of our Constitution and the equivalent of the Bill of Rights—
namely Section 24, which provides that “[a]nyone whose rights or 
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied 
may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as 
the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”34  
Standing under Section 24 is thereby limited to a person whose rights 
have been infringed. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: They’re all subject to 
a standing requirement? 
MR. IRWIN COTLER: Yes, but not Section 52.  We have 
developed a public interest doctrine, which means that when some 
organization or body can demonstrate that there is a serious question as 
to the validity of a law, that the organization is affected by or has a 
legitimate interest in the law, and, furthermore, that the controversy 
would not otherwise come before the court in the form of an 
individual’s litigation, then the court can assume jurisdiction to hear it. 
 
 33 Constitution Act, 1982, § 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
 34 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,  
§ 24(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
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The constitutionalization of judicial review in terms of rights 
protection began with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  It had 
existed previously under the rubric of federalism, the allocation of 
power between the federal government and the provinces.  That was 
what might be called the powers process.  The advent of the Charter 
gave us the rights process, and that’s when rights protection became 
constitutionalized.  In that vein, we just had a very important decision 
that came down on the issue of political questions in a case in which I 
was involved, the Khadr case.35 
In Khadr, issues of justiciability and standing were dramatically 
enhanced by the constitutionalization of rights protection under the 
Charter.  Ironically, in Israel, even without constitutionalization, you 
had the notion that everything was justiciable.  We in Canada, even with 
constitutionalization, did not have the notion that everything is 
justiciable.  Another example of the development of this notion in 
Canada was the issue of same-sex marriage, which could not have 
arisen before the Charter existed.  It would not have been seen to be 
justiciable, nor would anyone have had standing to bring the matter 
before the courts.  Because of the constitutionalization of rights 
protection with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it became 
justiciable as an issue and opened up the question of standing.  But I’ll 
deal with this later.36 
JUSTICE MORRIS FISH: Just a note regarding justiciability: 
Canada has largely rejected the political question doctrine.  This 
approach provides that the courts should choose not to entertain certain 
disputes whose subject matter is better resolved through the political 
process.  Our Court’s most explicit discussion of the doctrine is found in 
Justice Wilson’s concurrence in Operation Dismantle.37  There, Justice 
Wilson held that it was inappropriate for the Court to decline 
jurisdiction over matters with political consequences, so long as the 
question raised before the Court is a genuinely legal one. 
The doctrine still has some life in Canadian jurisprudence, 
however.  The Court will still refuse to hear cases that do not have a 
cognizable legal content, or cases that involve disputes that Parliament 
intended to be resolved through the political process.  What Canadian 
courts generally will not do, however, is to decline to hear a case for the 
prudential reason that resolving the legal issues at stake would have 
political consequences. 
A case I mentioned earlier, the Secession Reference,38 touched on 
 
 35 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (Can.), available at 
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2008/2008scc28/2008scc28.html. 
 36 See infra Part IV.C. 
 37 Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.). 
 38 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
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the political question issue.  In that case, interveners urged the Court not 
to answer the questions posed on the ground that they were 
nonjusticiable political questions.  The Court determined that, in 
general, reference questions were justiciable unless answering them 
“would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its proper role in 
the constitutional framework” or “if the Court could not give an answer 
that lies within its area of expertise: the interpretation of law.”39  The 
Court noted that the issues raised on the reference combined difficult 
legal and constitutional questions with complex political questions.  The 
Court determined that it was appropriate for the Court to address the 
legal issues, which did no more than set the framework within which 
political decisions were to be taken. 
In the recent Same-Sex Marriage Reference,40 the Court was 
thought by some to have departed from the rule that it will decide 
questions that have sufficient legal content, irrespective of prudential 
considerations. 
The fourth question posed in the reference was whether the old law 
defining marriage as between people of the opposite sex was 
unconstitutional.  The Court declined to answer that question because of 
the unique circumstances in which it was submitted to the Court.  In 
particular, the Court pointed to (1) the fact that the government planned 
to proceed with the proposed equal marriage legislation irrespective of 
the Court’s decision and (2) the fact that the reference question was 
identical to the issue that would have been raised had the government 
chosen to appeal the various decisions of the courts of appeal striking 
down the old definition of marriage.  Moreover, prior to the arrival of 
the reference at the Supreme Court, four provincial courts of appeal 
(Yukon, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan) had already ruled 
that the opposite-sex requirement for marriage was unconstitutional.41 
 
C.     Israel 
 
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: The basis of judicial review is 
legislation.  In 1995, the Supreme Court held in the United Mizrahi 
case42 that the Knesset, in enacting the Basic Law of Human Dignity 
and Liberty43 three years earlier, established a formal constitution for 
the State of Israel.  By declaring that, the Supreme Court laid the 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.). 
 41 See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at para. 66 (Can.). 
 42 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/93/210/068/z01/93068210.z01.htm. 
 43 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150. 
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foundations for its prerogative to conduct substantive judicial review of 
Knesset legislation.  I would like to refer to what Justice Barak said a 
few months after the adoption of this legislation.  He remarked, “the 
new legislation passed by the Knesset limits the Knesset and 
subordinates it to the fundamental principles.  From this point on the 
Court cannot only interpret a statute that is contrary to the fundamental 
principles, it can also nullify it.”44  In doing so, Barak says, “the people 
have given its judges a powerful tool.  Now that the people have given 
us tools, we shall do the work.”45  I’m sorry; I was in the Knesset in 
1992.  I clashed with the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice 
Committee when he brought the law to the final reading and I can 
testify personally that the word “constitution” was not mentioned by 
anyone of the members of the Knesset.  Ninety-five percent of them 
never thought that they had a constitutional power.  It’s the first time I 
hear that a country can get a constitution retroactively.  At the time of 
the legislation, the members of the Knesset did not know that they were 
adopting a constitution for the State of Israel, nor did anyone else.  How 
do I know?  In the newspapers the day after the enactment of the law, 
no one mentioned it.  It came to our knowledge that we made the 
constitution a few months later, when Barak said the words I quoted, in 
a speech and later in an article.  But, no one contemplated it at the time 
the law was enacted.  So, what is the basis for the declaration of the 
constitution?  In one judgment the Supreme Court combined two errors: 
declaring that we have a constitution and that from this day on the Court 
is also going to have the jurisdiction to nullify laws of the Israeli 
Knesset.  I’m sure this is one of the brilliant maneuvers of judicial 
activism. 
DR. JANICE SOKOLOVSKY46: My comments refer to the easy 
access of political non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the 
Israeli Supreme Court via the Bagatz procedure, in which the Court sits 
as a High Court of Justice.  The Judiciary Statute grants the Court very 
broad powers in these cases, in particular the power to order any public 
official “to do or refrain from doing any act [with]in the lawful exercise 
of [his] functions” for the sake of justice.47  Access to the Bagatz is 
today completely open.  Since there is no need for standing, anyone 
who sees injustice in any act by any public official, whether or not he 
personally is affected by that act, can file a petition for redress.   
Political advocacy NGOs file Bagatz petitions challenging critical 
 
 44 Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 MISHPAT 
UMIMSHAL [LAW & GOV’T] 9, 34 (1992) (Isr.) (Hebrew). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Dr. Sokolovsky is a member of the bar both in the United States and in Israel, where she 
has lived for the past twenty-three years. 
 47 Basic Law: The Judiciary, § 15(d)(2), 1984, S.H. 78. 
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policy or political issues that are not to their liking.  Should they have 
standing to file Bagatzim?  There are now about twenty NGOs that 
regularly file such actions.  They also lobby, prepare well-publicized 
reports on political issues, and receive permits for highly controversial 
demonstrations on political issues.  Some are not even registered in 
Israel, and many are heavily funded by foreign governments, 
particularly European governments.  In the United States, under the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act,48 such foreign-funded organizations 
would be required to register and identify themselves as agents of the 
funding foreign governments with respect to any political activity in 
which they engage, such as lobbying, or on any material they 
disseminate.  And of course, they would not be able to file political 
petitions in the U.S. Supreme Court without standing. 
PROFESSOR SHLOMO SLONIM49: I sympathize with Minister 
Eitan’s position that the Israeli Supreme Court took the law of Human 
Dignity and Liberty and ran away with it and established judicial 
review, but in a certain sense it was an open invitation.  In speaking to 
people who were involved in the legislation, they seem to have 
recognized at the time that there would be some form of judicial review, 
perhaps not as extensive, not as broad as what we have today, but it was 
very clear that the Court was going to do something.  However, having 
said that, we must also recognize that there are serious problems about 
the basis of judicial review in Israel.  Where did the Knesset obtain the 
authority to pass a law, which is considered to be a Basic Law?  In the 
United Mizrahi case, there were two opinions that were expressed, one 
by Chief Justice Shamgar and the other by Justice Barak.  Shamgar held 
that the Knesset was sovereign and had power to create a Basic Law of 
this nature.  Justice Barak said that the original Knesset was a 
constituent assembly empowered to formulate a constitution, that this 
power of being a constituent assembly was passed on to each of the 
subsequent Knessets, and that they were, therefore, able to adopt the 
Basic Laws. 
Both of these theses are problematic.  The most important problem 
is that the public has no say in the matter.  Bear in mind that this law on 
Human Dignity and Liberty was adopted not by a majority of the 
Knesset, but by a majority of those present.  Out of the entire Knesset, 
composed of 120 members, 32 voted in favor of the law—so there was 
no true majority that supported this.  It is, I think, incumbent on any 
fundamental change in a constitution that the public be consulted.  It’s 
interesting that in the United States, James Madison, known as the 
father of the Constitution, maintained that all the state constitutions 
 
 48 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006). 
 49 James G. McDonald Professor (Emeritus) of American History, The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem. 
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were in fact invalid at that time when they were adopted in 1776 and 
subsequently since they were never presented to the public for 
ratification.  It was only subsequently, when they received ratification 
by the public, that they were in a certain sense in his eyes validated.  
That is what is unique about the Constitution and the Bill of Rights of 
the United States, that the Constitution was ratified by the minimal 
number of nine states, as stipulated in the Constitution, and the Bill of 
Rights was adopted and ratified by a two-thirds majority of the state 
legislatures; so you have the involvement of the people in the process of 
endorsing a Constitution in the United States, something which, 
unfortunately, has been entirely lacking in the Israeli experience.  In any 
thought of confirming judicial review and in making it a permanent part 
of the Israeli Constitution, it would be desirable if some consultation 
with the general populace would be undertaken. 
JUSTICE ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN: I was quite—I wouldn’t say 
surprised—but saddened by what Minister Eitan was saying, because 
whoever reads the text of the two Basic Laws that have been the basis 
of the Israeli equivalent of Marbury v. Madison, called United Mizrahi 
Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village,50 decided in 1995, can 
identify that they include a constitutional power of judicial review, even 
if it is not stated explicitly, just as happened with the U.S. Constitution.  
The text, in my view, is clear.  You just have to read the limitation 
clause.  On June 13, 1950, two years after our independence, the 
Knesset decided that instead of promulgating a full-fledged constitution, 
we should enact Basic Laws, that would finally be incorporated into a 
constitution.  The first nine Basic Laws were mainly on government 
branches—legislative, executive, judicial—as well as on Jerusalem as 
our capital.  The last two, enacted in 1992, are Human Dignity and 
Liberty and the Freedom of Occupation.51  The limitation clause says, 
“There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a 
law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper 
purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.”52  What does that 
mean in simple words for any jurist, with all due respect to the Knesset?  
It means that laws could be examined through the lenses of the 
limitation clause.  I would have definitely preferred that what Professor 
Slonim said, that the constitutional laws should be accepted in a 
ceremonial way, would have materialized.  I agree with him on that.  
But this is not what happened, and the two Basic Laws on human and 
civil rights were accepted.  What do you do?  Obviously, they must be 
applied and interpreted.  Who interprets any law?  This is the role of the 
 
 50 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank. 
 51 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150; Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation, 1992 S.H. 114. 
 52 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty § 8, 1992, S.H. 150. 
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Court.  And if a law affects rights and is not in conformity with the 
Basic Laws, it cannot stand.  Here is the foundation of judicial review.  
The Knesset wrote it into a legal text, a constitutional law, a Basic Law.  
Who is going to interpret it?  It’s the court of law.  While I can argue 
with this or that decision of President Barak, a great jurist, I would 
never agree with what Judge Posner said about usurpation.  Judicial 
review was accepted in the United Mizrahi case by a nine-Justice panel, 
including retiring President Shamgar, who is not known necessarily as 
an “activist,” and President Barak, who was just coming in as President.   
My bottom line is simple: The Knesset may not have thought of it 
in constitutional terms the way it should have, but what it gave us, what 
it produced, is a constitutional text.   And when it produced a 
constitutional text, which clearly refers to the examination of laws per 
their content, judicial review, which has had origins even before, was 
definitely proclaimed—not by the Court, but by the Knesset. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: If I understood 
Professor Slonim, he was saying the Knesset didn’t have the authority to 
create constitutional values.  You’re saying the Knesset did? 
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: I’m an eye witness that none of 
the Knesset members exercised any constitutional power.  There was 
one member who was shouting that it is usurpation.  “You take power 
illegitimately from the Knesset and transfer it to the Supreme Court.”  
Uriel Linn—then-Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice 
Committee and the member who brought the bill—replied, “We are not 
transferring the balance of power to the Supreme Court.  No 
constitutional authority is established.  Nor does it establish a special 
constitutional court that is given special power to newly filed statutes.”  
And later on the Chairman, to convince the members of the Knesset, 
said again, “Power will not be transferred to the Court.  The power will 
remain in this House.”53  You have to understand that the Basic Law 
until that point was an ordinary law, it had no superiority.  People 
looked at this as a declaration, not as something substantive.  That’s 
why the majority of the Knesset members didn’t bother to come to 
debate or vote on it. 
The Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee 
welcomed the law and voted for it at the second and third (final) 
readings, even though he objected to the establishment of a 
constitutional court because he thought that doing so would give far too 
much power to a small group of judges whose interpretation would 
invalidate statutes, and he convinced the member of the Knesset that 
this statute would not do that.  That’s what he said a few minutes before 
the vote.  Three years later in his opinion in the United Mizrahi case, 
 
 53 These statements are from debates during Plenum No. 398 of the 12th Knesset, as reported 
by Minister Michael Eitan. 
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Justice Barak described these comments as supporting the idea that “the 
Basic Law is part of the State constitution.”54  What is this? 
 
III.     LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: What I would like to 
do now is discuss cases that panel members think should not have been 
decided by the Court or in which the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction 
was particularly controversial.  This is, of course, especially true in 
Israel, but there may be other cases that panelists want to raise in that 
connection for the United States and Canada as well.  Judge Posner, did 
you want to discuss some cases?  You raised some in an article that you 
wrote regarding the Israeli Supreme Court which you thought went 
beyond what courts normally decide or should decide. 
 
A.     Cases in the United States 
 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Sure, I’ll say a few words, except 
that I do want to make clear that I’m not an expert on the Israeli 
political or judicial systems, and I’m reluctant to talk about foreign 
judiciaries about which I know very little.  Justice Barak—in a book 
which I reviewed critically55—did not purport to be speaking just about 
Israel.  He was laying down what he considered to be universal 
principles of proper adjudication and the proper scope of judicial power, 
and I disagree with his conception as a general matter.  Maybe it’s 
something Israel needs, although I’m very impressed by the statements 
by Mr. Eitan and Professors Slonim and Friedmann, criticizing those 
views in the Israeli context.  But I don’t like to say that a specific Israeli 
decision is wrong, because it arises in a political context and a juridical 
context that is pretty alien to my understanding. 
One could divide Professor Halberstam’s question into two.  
There’s a question concerning cases in which the Supreme Court has 
exceeded its jurisdiction, in the sense of not honoring these principles of 
standing, ripeness, and so on that are basic to the Anglo-American 
judicial tradition.  And then there are cases that are just mistaken 
decisions or reckless decisions. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: You mean 
substantively mistaken? 
 
 54 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221. 
 55 Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007, at 53 (reviewing 
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JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Substantively mistaken, but I take it 
you’re not interested in those. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: No, but I think that 
there may be some cases, even beyond the standing and political 
question doctrine, which are just beyond what a court should do. 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: One example would be the standing 
issue that was presented in Roe v. Wade56 because human beings do not 
have the same gestation period as elephants.  It’s really hard to litigate 
an abortion case to judgment in nine months, or in six months if you 
discovered you were pregnant after three months.  So the Supreme 
Court created a doctrine that if a case is capable of repetition but evades 
review because the individual case will become moot before it can be 
decided, still there is standing.  So the woman who seeks an abortion 
and might become pregnant in the future and want another one is 
permitted to litigate her right to abort the first pregnancy even if she’s 
already given birth to the child.  I think that’s mistaken actually.  I think 
the standing requirement should be enforced very rigorously.  That 
would not have precluded a challenge to the abortion laws, but it would 
have had to be a challenge by an abortion clinic or by a doctor who was 
prosecuted for violating laws against abortion, and that I think is 
significant because we really want—it sounds cruel—but we really want 
people to pay a price in order to sue, to subject themselves to a risk of 
prosecution or the actuality of prosecution before they can get into 
court, because it’s very important to limit access to the courts. 
Listening to Justice Rubinstein about the 11,000 cases reviewed in 
the Israeli Supreme Court each year, the United States has roughly fifty 
times the population of Israel.  So imagine 550,000 cases being 
submitted directly to the nine Supreme Court Justices.  You’d need 
hundreds of Supreme Court Justices. 
It’s a strange thing about government, but you can’t scale up every 
level of government to adjust to changes in population.  You can’t have 
hundreds of Supreme Court Justices even if you have 300 million 
people in your country.  You can’t have dozens of Presidents even 
though you have an immense population.  So you need to have elaborate 
structures for screening.  It’s like the brontosaurus with the tiny head. 
Other cases that strain the concept of standing involve the 
exception to standing that allows an individual federal taxpayer to 
challenge a congressional appropriation for religion.  If the United 
States decided to make Islam the official religion of the United States 
and appropriated money to build mosques, taxpayers would be allowed 
to challenge that as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.  But it wouldn’t really be legitimate from a standing point 
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of view because the harm to the individual taxpayer from a particular 
appropriation is negligible.  The exception is a rule that’s been adopted 
in order to permit certain types of legal issues—which happen, in the 
establishment context, to be very controversial—to be litigated. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Implicit in what you 
are saying is that you think standing is a desirable limitation.  Would 
you like to say a little about that? 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: Yes, and I’ll give an example of a 
case—the Newdow case.57  The Ninth Circuit, which is the most liberal 
federal court of appeals, held that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance was unconstitutional.  It struck God from the Pledge of 
Allegiance, causing a scandal, but since it was just applicable in the 
western states that comprise the Ninth Circuit, it wasn’t cataclysmic.  
But it was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court in an 
implausible opinion by Justice Stevens ruled that there was no standing 
to challenge the “under God” provision because the person who brought 
the case, Mr. Newdow, was the father of the child who was being forced 
to say “under God” in her public school and he didn’t have custody of 
her (he was divorced from her mother).  Justice Stevens is not a big 
standing buff.  So it was an inauthentic decision and I think just 
reflected the fact that the Supreme Court did not want to be accused of 
removing God from the Pledge of Allegiance.  It’s a real strength of the 
Supreme Court that it has all sorts of ways of ducking controversial 
issues.  And the most important thing really is not the little tricks played 
in a case like Newdow but the fact that you can’t even get into the 
Supreme Court without a case.  And a case takes a long time to get to 
the Supreme Court, so that the Supreme Court doesn’t have to intervene 
and maybe invalidate some very popular law for years.  By the time the 
case finally gets to the Supreme Court, the popularity of the law may 
have waned, or the circumstances may show that as it’s actually 
administered it’s not as bad as it seemed when it was enacted. 
So our system—I’m not saying it’s the right system for every 
country, but it has enabled the Supreme Court to be powerful but also to 
be restrained so that it fits our constitutional conception of a balance of 
powers.  We don’t want any branch to be all powerful.  It’s been a 
successful balancing process. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Mr. Lewin, do you 
want to add either American or Israeli cases that you want to comment 
on? 
NATHAN LEWIN: Sure.  Let me say preliminarily that it seems to 
me that there is a significant difference between the things that we were 
discussing earlier, which is the assumption of power on the part of the 
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Supreme Court to declare certain acts of the Knesset illegal unless the 
Knesset re-enacts those over the rulings of the Supreme Court.  By 
comparison, in the United States, judicial supremacy controls regardless 
of what Congress thinks.  My colleague here, Professor Hamilton, was 
successful in persuading the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional 
an act of Congress that was enacted unanimously.58  Congress did not 
have a single dissenting vote when it enacted a law that said that 
religious freedom should be protected even after Justice Scalia wrote an 
opinion under the Free Exercise Clause that really eliminated protection 
for religious observance against neutral standards.  Had Congress had 
the power that the Knesset has to overrule what the Supreme Court said, 
I think, given that it voted unanimously for that law, Congress would 
probably have overruled the Supreme Court.  So, I am not as troubled 
by the notion that a Supreme Court can say an act of the legislature is 
presumptively contrary to some very basic principles on which the 
country stands.  I think probably in the British system that’s permissible 
even in the absence of a written constitution, and it doesn’t offend me 
so much. 
On the other hand, what does offend me in terms of the decisions 
of the Barak Court are areas that the Barak Court and the Israeli 
Supreme Court have gone into which to an American lawyer are 
bizarre.  There’s been a lot of things in the press, for example, about the 
criminal prosecution of a former president of Israel, Mr. Katzav, and the 
Israeli Supreme Court vacated a plea agreement entered between him 
and the prosecutor.  That a decision by a prosecutor to enter into a 
disposition of a criminal case with the defendant should be subject to 
court review I find bizarre.  U.S. prosecutors are given broad power to 
conclude dispositions under which people plead guilty.  There’s a 
reduced sentence and unless there’s some extreme reason such as 
bribery of the prosecutor, the courts have no business going into that. 
The Israeli Supreme Court actually enforces political agreements 
between parties in election campaigns.  There are written agreements, 
and there have been cases by the Israeli Supreme Court in which such 
agreements are treated, subject to certain reservations, almost as if they 
were contracts between private parties.59  If there’s ever a political 
question, I would think that an agreement between two political parties 
regarding how ministries should be divided up or other things is not 
enforceable in the courts and should not be reviewed by the courts.  The 
Israeli Supreme Court has invalidated appointments; the Ginossar case60 
invalidated an appointment because the Supreme Court decided that the 
person who was appointed was just not appropriate for that particular 
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position.  That’s not a function of courts.  These are all questions, which 
I think are plainly nonjusticiable because courts have no business 
getting into those areas.  And yet the Israeli Supreme Court has gotten 
into it with Justice Barak. 
There are other areas that the Court has gotten into after it resisted 
doing so for a long time on standing grounds.  For example, deciding 
whether exemptions for Yeshiva students from the military was, I think, 
rejected three times on the ground that the person who brought the 
lawsuit had no standing.  Finally, Justice Barak in a leading case, the 
Ressler case,61 said, “no, I don’t like standing.  There’s no reason why 
the court shouldn’t look into it,” and it found a basis for entertaining 
that lawsuit.  I think in the United States we could have found parties 
that could have brought that to court and satisfied the standards for 
standing so that the decision on the merits, which ultimately sustained 
the exemption for Yeshiva students, could have been reached in the 
United States.   
Let me just very briefly tell you about a very particular case 
involving standing and justiciability that I am litigating.  I am presently 
in the middle of a lawsuit that involves exactly these issues of standing 
and justiciability.62  The Department of State of the United States has 
refused to allow American citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” 
on their passports.  They say the passport can only say “Jerusalem.”  It 
can’t say “Israel.”  Congress passes a law and tells the Secretary of 
State you have to say “Israel” for any American citizen born in 
Jerusalem who wants his passport to say “Israel.”  We bring a lawsuit 
based on the congressional statute.  Along comes a district court and 
sustains the government’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground that 
there’s no standing on the part of our client, the youngest client of our 
firm.  He’s now six years old.  We brought this lawsuit six years ago 
when he was two months old.  The district court says no standing.  He 
has a perfectly valid passport.  He doesn’t have standing.  That’s a 
misuse of the standing principle.  We take it up to the court of appeals.  
The court of appeals says the district judge was wrong on standing.  
There is standing because Congress said his passport should say 
“Israel.”  They reverse it and send it back to the district judge.  This 
time the district judge dismisses it on the ground that it’s a political 
question. 
We say it’s not a political question.  Congress has enacted a statute 
that says that the passport should say “Israel.”  The case is now before 
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the court of appeals.63   
In my view, these are instances of misuse of standing and 
justiciability in the United States. 
 
B.     Cases in Israel 
 
PROFESSOR SHLOMO SLONIM: Judicial review, the power of a 
court to declare the actions of a legislature or executive 
unconstitutional, is an American invention that, in the words of the 
noted American historian, Charles Beard, constitutes “the most unique 
contribution to the science of government which has been made by 
American political genius.”64  It has earned widespread global respect 
and admiration and has been increasingly adopted in recent decades by 
other democratic regimes, including Israel.  That Israel has adopted 
judicial review is, on its face, puzzling on several counts.  Israel has no 
formal written document that can be labeled a constitution; Israel’s 
legislative body, the Knesset, like its British model, controls the 
jurisdiction of the courts; and no Act of the Knesset has expressly 
endowed the Court with the necessary competence.   
Supporters of judicial review point to two Basic Laws enacted in 
1992—Human Dignity and Liberty, and Freedom of Occupation65—as 
acts that implicitly guarantee human rights and entitle an injured party 
to have recourse to judicial remedies, including a declaration that 
legislative or executive action is unconstitutional.  Critics have felt that 
the Court was too self-aggrandizing, and they have sought occasionally 
to narrow the scope of judicial review.  Most notably, this occurred in 
2008, when Professor Daniel Friedmann, then-Minister of Justice, 
proposed restrictive legislation that aroused the ire of the Supreme 
Court Justices.   
To understand how differently judicial review is applied today in 
the United States and in Israel, it is instructive to examine judicial 
approaches to such matters as standing to sue and justiciability; the 
handling of national security matters, especially in the context of an 
ongoing conflict; and intervention in the internal operation of the 
legislature or the executive. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s power of judicial review derives from 
no specific constitutional grant.  But very early on, the Court assumed 
the power to have the final say about the validity of the acts of the other, 
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theoretically co-equal, branches of government in the separation-of-
powers governmental system.  The Court instituted a doctrine of self-
restraint, most notably by adopting the political question doctrine.  The 
principle was already enunciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
Marbury v. Madison, the case that established the power of judicial 
review.  Marshall said: “Questions, in their nature political, . . . can 
never be made in this court.”66 
The Israeli governmental framework is quite different.  Like the 
British Parliament, the Knesset was, in theory, subject to no restriction 
on its legislative capacity.  The Israeli Supreme Court exercises 
jurisdiction in two capacities: as a Court of Appeal in all cases dealt 
with by the lower courts, and as the High Court of Justice, where it rules 
as a court of first and last instance on any administrative or 
constitutional question brought before it “in the interests of justice.”  It 
is in the latter capacity that the Court has instituted a virtual revolution 
in the constitutional framework of the State, evoking thereby a powerful 
reaction in the other two branches of the government to rein in the 
judiciary. 
 
1.     Standing to Sue and Justiciability  
 
For Israel, in the initial decades, standing was basically on par with 
the American pattern.  Thus, in a 1971 case, Justice Sussman ruled: 
We will not hear the petition of a man complaining that the authority 
acted illegally, if he cannot show why he and no one else should 
request the correction of the irregularity.  For it must be emphasized 
that the Court is not competent to stand guard over the observance of 
the law and the prevention of injustice in general.  This is not the 
task of the judge.67 
In order to understand how the reach of the Court has extended so 
far that practically everything is justiciable and virtually everyone has 
standing to sue, it is necessary to trace one source of jurisdiction that is 
uniquely available to the Israeli Supreme Court.  In addition to 
exercising appellate jurisdiction over lower courts, the Supreme Court 
excercises original jurisdiction as the High Court of Justice to rule on 
administrative and constitutional questions.  
For some forty years the Supreme Court employed this jurisdiction 
rather sparingly, and only in the more egregious cases did it intervene to 
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administer justice.  Standing was limited by the generally accepted 
standard requiring evidence of injury. 
With the entry of Justice Aharon Barak to the Supreme Court, and 
particularly after he became President of the Court in 1995, the 
jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice was vastly expanded, both by 
eliminating practically every restriction on standing and by the adoption 
of a policy of activism designed to promote greater “democracy” in 
Israel.  The Court, in Barak’s view, was to serve as the guardian of 
justice and morality in Israeli society.  The standard by which these 
values were to be defined and assessed were those of the majority of the 
Court.  This approach represented an extraordinary innovation for the 
role of a court and exceeded the pattern prevalent in Western 
democratic states.  It constituted an assumption of competence that was 
never bestowed on the Court by the Knesset, nor sanctioned in any way 
by public acclamation or plebiscite.   
 
2.     Judicial Directions to the Military in an Ongoing Conflict 
 
The basic approach of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding judicial 
intervention in an ongoing conflict is reflected in the 1950 case of 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, where even dissenting Justice Hugo Black 
declared: 
It has always been recognized that actual warfare can be conducted 
successfully only if those in command are left the most ample 
independence in the theatre of operations.  Our Constitution is not so 
impractical or inflexible that it unduly restricts such necessary 
independence.  It would be fantastic to suggest that alien enemies 
could hail our military leaders into judicial tribunals to account for 
their day-to-day activities on the battlefront.  Active fighting forces 
must be free to fight while hostilities are in progress.68 
More recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, while they 
extended rights, such as habeas corpus, to prisoners held in 
Guantanamo, have in no way modified the basic principle enunciated by 
Justice Black that American courts do not presume to intervene and 
issue directives to fighting forces in an ongoing conflict.  As one writer 
has said:  
In the United States, it would have been unthinkable for the Supreme 
Court to intervene in the military strategy of American forces in Iraq 
or Afghanistan. . . .  [A] strong commitment to separation of powers 
(manifested, in part, through the doctrines of justiciability or political 
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questions), would have made any review of such operations highly 
improbable.69 
In Israel, in stark contrast, judicial intervention in military affairs 
during the course of an actual conflict has been far from rare.  Ever 
since the Israeli Supreme Court adopted the position that everything is 
justiciable and practically everyone has standing, the Court has become 
a forum in which contesting parties vie to extract directives from the 
Court regarding the conduct of the organs charged with national 
security.  The Court has deemed itself qualified, indeed obligated, to 
issue orders regarding ongoing military operations.  Thus, during 
Operation “Defensive Shield” in April 2002 in Judea and Samaria 
following the terrorist Passover Seder massacre, the Court intervened 
with respect to several military decisions, including the fighting in Jenin 
and the army siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in which 
Palestinian terrorists had taken refuge.  A vivid illustration of the 
Court’s new role was provided by the Rafah case, decided on May 30, 
2004.70  The judgment by Court President Aharon Barak, on behalf of 
the three-Justice panel, noted that combat activities by the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) had been going on in Rafah since May 18, i.e., for 
twelve days.  Rafah is located in the Gaza Strip, and the military action 
was designed to arrest terrorists operating in the area, to locate arms 
caches, and destroy tunnels used to smuggle in arms and weapons from 
Egypt to Gaza.  The suit before the Court was instituted by B’Tselem 
and several other Israeli NGOs active in the field of human rights.  They 
petitioned the Court to order the IDF to facilitate the entry of medical 
teams and ambulances into Gaza to treat wounded civilians; to restore 
damaged water and electricity supplies; to allow provision of food and 
water for the residents of Rafah; to investigate an incident in which 
civilians were killed by shellfire; and to allow civilians to attend the 
funerals of their deceased relatives. 
In his opening remarks, Barak stressed that the Court would not 
interfere in the midst of actual combat when the lives of soldiers are at 
stake.  But  he did not consider that the present situation was of such a 
nature, and he went on to declare: “Israel is not an isolated island.  She 
is a member of an international system. . . .  There are legal norms—of 
customary international law, of treaties to which Israel is [a] party, and 
of the fundamental principles of Israeli law—which set out how military 
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operations should be conducted.”71  On the role of the judiciary, he 
stated:  
We do not review the wisdom of the decision to take military action.  
We review the legality of the military operations. . . .  The question 
before us is only whether these military operations adhere to 
domestic and international law. . . .  We examine the legal import of 
[the military] decisions.  That is our expertise.72 
The IDF, Barak said, “must act with integrity . . . , with reasonableness 
and proportionality, and appropriately balance individual liberty and the 
public interest.”73 
It is to be noted that in advance of the engagement, the IDF had 
taken steps to minimize any harm or injury to civilians.  A “hotline” to 
resolve urgent humanitarian problems was set up; an officer was 
designated to maintain contact with the Red Cross and Palestinian 
hospitals; and a liaison officer was stationed with every battalion to 
attend to humanitarian needs among the civilians and the evacuation of 
the injured. 
The Court stressed that it was incumbent on the army to refrain 
from operations that might entail civilian casualties even in the search 
for terrorists who are integrated in the civilian population.  Given this 
basic principle, even though the military campaign was still in 
operation, the Court ruled that the army had to allow convoys to bring 
in food and water, to make provision for the evacuation of the wounded, 
and to allow civilians to attend the funerals of relatives as an 
accommodation for the dignity of the dead.  All of this judicial activity 
occurred while military operations were being pursued. 
Although the IDF had striven to avoid harming civilians, and had 
even permitted supplies to reach areas in the combat zone, the Court had 
deemed these measures insufficient, and had substituted its own, far 
more stringent standards of necessity and proportionality for those of 
the military.  Any disruption of normal civilian life had to be justified 
by these standards, notwithstanding the fact that terrorists exploited 
Israeli leniency in order to launch attacks against Israeli forces and 
civilians. 
It is clear that the Israeli Supreme Court’s position during Israel’s 
current sustained and ongoing conflict differs markedly from that 
enunciated by Justice Black in the Eisentrager case, and from the 
restrictive operative doctrines, even today, of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
But Israel’s domestic and international position is far more difficult than 
that of the United States, and the Court therefore feels compelled to 
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engage in a delicate balancing act.  On the one hand, Justice Barak has 
stressed that “this Court will take no position regarding the manner in 
which combat is being conducted.  As long as soldiers’ lives are in 
danger, these decisions will be made by the commanders.”74  
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to conclude that judicial intervention 
does not impinge on the freedom of action and movement of military 
forces.  But counterbalancing this is the conviction that the Supreme 
Court’s intervention shields Israel from much foreign criticism and its 
ministers and commanders from subjection to criminal prosecution 
before the International Criminal Court and before the judicial tribunals 
of states invoking universal jurisdiction to try violations of international 
criminal law.  The infamous Goldstone Report, however, underscores 
the fact that even strict supervision of military actions by the Israeli 
judiciary organs, including the Supreme Court, cannot be relied on to 
deflect harsh and unjustified criticism of Israel’s self-defensive 
measures against an unrelenting terrorist foe, whose actions defy all the 
norms of international humanitarian law.   
 
3.     Judicial Review of Parliamentary Proceedings 
 
In the United States, the Supreme Court studiously avoids 
becoming embroiled in the internal affairs of either the legislature or the 
executive.  Such restraint contrasts with the attitude of the Israeli 
Supreme Court in recent years in relation to the other two branches of 
government, in accordance with its generally expansive notion of 
justiciability. 
Thus, in the 1981 case of Sarid v. Chairman of the Knesset, the 
Court undertook to investigate a decision of the Speaker to schedule a 
motion of no-confidence at 5 P.M. rather than at 11 A.M., the usual 
hour for such motions.75  The applicant, an opposition member of the 
Knesset, charged that the hearing of the motion was postponed so as to 
allow absent government members to return in time for the vote.  The 
Court declined to act in this case, but the decision to accept the case and 
investigate set a pattern for subsequent interventions in the affairs of the 
Parliament.  In the 1981 case of Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee, 
the Court disallowed an attempt by a Knesset committee to deny a  
member of the Knesset whose appeal against a criminal conviction was 
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pending before the Court the right to be seated in the Knesset.76  In a 
1985 case, the Court decided that a long-standing rule of the Knesset 
that a single member could not move a motion of no-confidence was 
unconstitutional because it discriminated against a faction of one.77  
Furthermore, an attempt by the Speaker in 1984 to bar the submission of 
a draft law to the Knesset on the ground that it was racist, was declared 
unconstitutional.78  A member of the Knesset, it was held, was free to 
submit legislative proposals, and the Speaker was not at liberty to 
discriminate between one draft law and another.  In the 1985 Miari 
case, the Court ruled that the Knesset could not remove the immunity of 
a member for participating in a public meeting in which the terrorist 
leader, Arafat, had been present.79  The immunity of a Knesset member 
extended beyond his immediate work in the Knesset, and his 
participation in a public meeting of this kind was legitimate.  Hence, he 
could not be tried for such action, and stripping him of his immunity 
was unconstitutional. 
These cases are merely illustrative of the willingness of the Court 
to intercede in a domain that has traditionally been deemed, in 
separation-of-powers doctrine, the preserve of the legislative body—
whether at the level of parliamentary committees or that of the House 
Speaker.  Similarly, the Court has occasionally sat in judgment on 
decisions of the government and declared some of these to be 
unreasonable.  In his book, The Judge in a Democracy, Justice Barak 
lists several instances where the Court applied the test of reasonableness 
as a basis for invalidating governmental decisions.80  Thus, on 
application by a public-minded institution, the Court compelled a 
minister and deputy minister charged with serious crimes to resign, 
before any trial had taken place.81  On the other hand, the Court 
determined that a lame-duck government was not barred from 
negotiating a peace agreement.  The Court said that such authority for a 
transitional government was reasonable.82 
In its handling of administrative affairs, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has unquestionably fulfilled a valuable task by nullifying grossly 
unpalatable decisions and demanding an exemplary standard for 
governmental appointments.  And to the extent that judicial intervention 
and the threat of such intervention have induced the government to 
 
 76 HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 118, 141. 
 77 HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141, 152. 
 78 HCJ 742/84 Kahane v. Knesset Speaker [1984] IsrSC 39(4) 85. 
 79 HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 41(4) 169. 
 80 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 250 (2006). 
 81 HCJ 4267/93 Amitai v. Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 441, 473. 
 82 See HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister [2001] IsrSC 55(2) 55, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/00/670/051/a13/00051670.a13.htm, discussed in BARAK, 
supra note 80, at 250-51. 
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adopt higher standards in its selection of personnel and its decision-
making process, the Court’s judicial review has had a salutary effect.  
Yet, there is a danger that the too-ready availability and exercise of this 
judicial role may ultimately attenuate the necessary self-discipline of the 
governmental administrative apparatus.   As Professor Stephen 
Goldstein, a prominent liberal, once observed: “I don’t think judges 
have a roving commission to do right.  And in the long run, [judicial 
involvement in governmental appointments] has an undesirable effect of 
weakening other agencies . . . .”83 
When judicial review of Knesset laws is invoked, the danger is that 
sooner or later, the legislative-judicial clash of perspectives may spawn 
a major constitutional crisis.  The better part of wisdom might therefore 
lead the Court to adopt a self-disciplining political question doctrine 
based on the American model. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Doctor Sokolovsky, 
you had some cases that you were going to discuss. 
DR. JANICE SOKOLOVSKY: I’m going to address the security 
fence issue, the sanctions in Gaza case, and a few others.  But, before I 
do that, I want to put my thesis out: I am concerned not only with the 
issues themselves, but also with who is bringing these political cases—
in particular, those cases that affect national security.  And I have 
learned that most are filed by approximately twenty NGOs, each of 
which maintains varying levels of legitimacy in Israel. 
In Israel, a non-profit organization is called an Amuta, and the law 
regulating non-profit organizations is called the Amutot Law.84  In order 
to be registered as an Amuta and to receive an identification number, the 
organization must complete a registration form—which requires 
disclosures concerning financing, activities, and personnel—and then 
file annual returns.  It then has a legal identity.  In order to receive 
funding from the Israeli government, the Amuta must make more 
detailed disclosures and receive a Certificate of Proper Management (in 
Hebrew, Nihul Takin).  Virtually all high-quality Amutot in Israel have 
the Certificate of Proper Management.  However, there are many 
politically active groups that are not even registered in Israel—meaning 
they have no status as a legal entity in Israel—that nevertheless are able 
to file Bagatz petitions in the Israeli High Court.  Of even greater 
concern, many Amutot, even those which are properly registered in 
Israel, receive significant funding from foreign governments.  I’m not 
talking about foreign charities or foreign individuals; I’m talking 
foreign governments, including the governments of England, Holland, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Austria, and the European 
Union. 
 
 83 See Evelyn Gordon, The Arm of the Law Grows Longer, JERUSALEM POST, July 26, 1993. 
 84 Amutot [Non-Profit Organizations] Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 239 (1948-89) (Isr.). 
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And my contention is this: I don’t think that any non-profit 
organization, any NGO, should have access to file a Bagatz—
particularly on political or security issues—unless it meets two non-
ideological criteria, which would apply equally to right-wing and left-
wing groups.  First, it should be properly registered as an Amuta in 
Israel and have received a Certificate of Proper Management.  Second, 
it should be disqualified if it receives funding from a foreign 
government.  This would be similar to what prevails in the United 
States, where there are restrictions on lobbying and other forms of 
political activity by groups funded by foreign governments.  For 
example, the Foreign Agents Registration Act85 requires transparency 
for the political activities of such organizations so that if they 
disseminate a report, they must identify themselves on the cover of the 
report as being agents of their funding governments.  That is my basic 
thesis—that any NGO that files a Bagatz in Israel, or even lobbies 
(although I’m not talking about lobbying now), should meet these two 
criteria. 
Now, I want to discuss some of the cases that Professor Slonim 
talked about, for example, those cases regarding the security fence 
issues.  The security fence was planned to be 831 kilometers, of which 
only 490 have been built to date.  One particular route of 60 kilometers 
was changed because of rulings of the High Court and another 100 
kilometers are still under dispute, which means 160 kilometers of the 
planned 831 are in limbo or have been changed because of rulings in 
Bagatz cases.  That’s twenty percent of the route of the security fence, 
which is a matter of life and death for those of us who live in Israel.  We 
know that the security fence works; we know it.86 
 Another case was a Bagatz petition against the small Shomron 
community of Migron filed primarily by two NGOs, one of which was 
Peace Now,87 an extremely active filer of Bagatz petitions.  However, 
Peace Now is not registered in Israel.  It does not have any legal 
standing whatsoever and is, therefore, ironically immune from being 
sued.  In fact, not long ago, Peace Now wrote some very unflattering 
comments about a fellow in Israel.  He sued the organization for 
defamation and won—perhaps 50,000 shekels—in a lower court.  Yet 
when he sought to collect the damages award, Peace Now successfully 
 
 85 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006). 
 86 In an early 2004 report, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that in 2003—the first 
year in which a section of the wall was completed—the number of terrorist attacks decreased by 
30% from 2002, and the number of victims murdered in terrorist attacks decreased by 50% from 
2002.  ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SAVING LIVES: ISRAEL’S ANTI-TERRORIST 
FENCE—ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 17 (2004), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/ 
6706D746-F400-4215-A678-EF1A39B775F9/0/savinglives.pdf. 
 87 See Petition for an Order Nisi, Razek el-Nabut v. Minister of Def., HCJ 8887/06 (Oct. 
2006) (Isr.), available at http://www.peacenow.org.il/data/SIP_STORAGE/files/8/2528.doc. 
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contended that it could not be forced to pay because it is not registered 
in Israel—that is, since the organization doesn’t legally exist in Israel, it 
cannot be sued there.  Hence, Peace Now is permitted to file a Bagatz 
petition that affects the route of the security fence—ultimately affecting 
the placement of settlements—yet is simultaneously immune from 
paying a libel claim because it is not registered.  That is amazing. 
Furthermore, Peace Now has been investigated for financial 
irregularities regarding the manner in which it receives its funding.  
Despite these investigations and its non-existence in Israel, Peace Now 
continues to file Bagatz petitions.  To me, this is not proper procedure.  
No organization that is not registered properly in Israel should be 
allowed to file a Bagatz petition. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Do you want to tell us 
a little bit about the legislation you are proposing on this? 
DR. JANICE SOKOLOVSKY: That is the gist of the legislation.88  
My proposed legislation would say that no group is allowed to lobby or 
to file a Bagatz petition unless it meets those two criteria—that it is 
properly registered in Israel with a Certificate of Proper Management, 
and that it does not receive funding from foreign governments.  To 
show you how standard the requirement of Nihul Takin—proper 
management—is, I will give you an example.  Recently, I nominated 
someone for the President’s Award for Volunteerism.  The nominations 
form stated that if you are nominating an Amuta rather than an 
individual, you must attach its Certificate of Proper Management.  So, if 
a group needs a Certificate of Nihul Takin in order to receive an award 
for volunteerism—which doesn’t affect life and death—a fortiori, it 
should be required to attach such a certificate to its Bagatz petition.  
This would demonstrate to the High Court that the petitioner is a legal 
entity in Israel, and has made the required disclosures about its activities 
and administration. 
By imposing the two criteria I have proposed on NGOs that seek to 
file Bagatz petitions, we could limit the quite inappropriate effect of 
unregistered or foreign funded organizations on sensitive policy and 
security issues. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Judge Posner stated 
that he did not want to comment on the Israeli Supreme Court here.  I 
would, therefore, like to read from his review of Justice Barak’s book.  
Judge Posner wrote, “What Barak created out of whole cloth was a 
 
 88 Several months after this Conference, Minister Michael Eitan initiated a bill entitled “The 
Duty of Disclosure for Someone Supported by a Foreign Political Entity, 5770-2010,” and Dr. 
Sokolovsky participated in the drafting.  On December 1, 2009, the bill was presented at a 
seminar in the Knesset entitled “Foreign Government Funding for NGO Political Activity in 
Israel,” at which Dr. Sokolovsky was one of the speakers.  The bill was then tabled in the 
Knesset. 
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degree of judicial power undreamed of even by our most aggressive 
Supreme Court justices.”89  He goes on to say, “Among the rules of law 
that Barak’s judicial opinions have been instrumental in creating that 
have no counterpart in American law are,” and he lists quite a number, 
but I’ll just read a few: “that any government action that is 
‘unreasonable’ is illegal (‘put simply, the executive must act reasonably, 
for an unreasonable act is an unlawful act’).”90  In other words, the 
Court can determine any act to be unlawful if it thinks it’s unreasonable.   
And further:  
[T]hat a court can countermand military orders, decide “whether to 
prevent the release of a terrorist within the framework of a political 
‘package deal,’” and direct the government to move the security wall 
that keeps suicide bombers from entering Israel from the West Bank.  
   These are powers that a nation could grant its judges. . . .  But 
only in Israel (as far as I know) do judges confer the power of 
abstract review on themselves, without benefit of a constitutional or 
legislative provision.91 
 
IV.     INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS 
A.     Professor Daniel Friedmann: The Judge as Philospher-King 
 
The Israeli Supreme Court began to function shortly after the 
establishment of the State in 1948.  For the first forty years the Court 
was fairly activist, yet it maintained a number of basic rules that led to 
restraint and enabled it to reach a highly balanced approach. 
All this has changed in a process that began some twenty-five 
years ago after the appointment of Justice Meir Shamgar as President of 
the Supreme Court.  Meir Shamgar served as President from 1983 until 
his retirement in 1995.  During this period there was considerable 
expansion in the power of the Court.  Yet, the Court remained cautious 
in matters of defense and security and some restraints remained in force.  
Upon Shamgar’s retirement, Barak became President of the Supreme 
Court and whatever restraint remained on the Court’s jurisdiction was 
rapidly to disappear.  The following points reflect the extent of the 
change. 
 
 89 Posner, supra note 55. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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1.     The “Constitutional Revolution” 
 
In 1992, the Knesset adopted the Basic Law of Human Dignity and 
Liberty.  It protects a number of human rights, but certain rights, 
notably the right to equality and the right of marriage were not included.  
This was done on purpose in order not to raise the opposition of the 
religious parties who insist on the continuation of religious monopoly in 
the field of marriage and divorce.  Section 8 of the Basic Law, the 
limitation clause, provides that: “There shall be no violation of rights 
under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of 
Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is 
required.”92  Members of the Knesset who voted for the Basic Law 
hardly thought that they had revolutionized the legal system.  But 
shortly afterwards the idea that we have had a “constitutional 
revolution” was greatly publicized.  Justice Barak strongly advocated 
this theory in his lectures and writings.  In the United Mizrahi case,93 
decided shortly after Shamgar’s retirement, all the Justices agreed that 
there was no ground to invalidate the Law in question.  This, however, 
did not prevent the Court from embarking upon a lengthy discussion of 
a host of constitutional questions, some of which remain unresolved to 
date, including the power of the Knesset to bind itself (can the Knesset 
legislate a Basic Law that can only be changed by unanimous vote?).  
The end product acquired the form of an obiter of about 350 pages.  
Many questions remained open.  But the bottom line became clear: The 
Court has power to invalidate Knesset legislation.  The fact that all this 
was mere dicta was drowned in the lengthy dissertations. 
Barak’s presidency thus opened with the legal revolution.  It is 
questionable whether the limitation clause in the Basic Law was 
intended to grant the Court power to invalidate Knesset legislation.  It 
was clearly possible to offer a more modest interpretation, since there 
are no express words in the Law that authorize the Court to review 
legislation.94  But, it is at least arguable that the Court’s interpretation 
can be anchored in the language of the Basic Law.  The next question 
 
 92 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150. 
 93 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221.  
Shamgar himself was able to participate in accordance with the rule that allows a judge to deliver 
a decision within three months after his retirement. 
 94 Section 11 of the Law provides that “[a]ll governmental authorities are bound to respect the 
rights under this Basic Law.”  It is not clear whether the Hebrew term that has been translated 
“governmental authorities” includes the Knesset—so it was an open question whether the Basic 
Law was also directed by the Knesset to the Knesset itself.  In addition, it does not follow that it is 
the Court that was granted the power to supervise Knesset legislation nor is it clear that legislation 
that is not in line with the limitation clause becomes automatically void.  An interpretation is 
conceivable that requires the Knesset to deal with this matter. 
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which arose related to the position of all the Basic Laws that were 
enacted in the past.95  Most of the provisions in the Basic Laws are not 
“entrenched” and traditionally Basic Laws were not considered as being 
on a higher normative level than any other Knesset legislation and could 
be changed by “ordinary” legislation.96 
But all this seems of no avail against the Supreme Court’s 
unlimited power of creative interpretation.  Encouraged by its decision 
regarding the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty, the Court 
stated that the mere title “Basic Law” endows the statute with 
constitutional standing, and grants the Court the power to invalidate 
legislation that, in the Court’s view, is not in line with the Basic Law.97  
Hence, the Court without having even a shred of legitimacy, has endowed 
hundreds of provisions enacted in the past with constitutional standing and 
thus created a “constitution” where none existed before. 
 
2.     Unreasonableness 
 
Traditionally, “unreasonableness” had a very limited role in 
judicial review.  It was usually combined with other causes of action or 
served in a number of specific situations—notably in the context of by-
laws of local authorities.98  Justice Barak in a series of cases that began 
shortly after his appointment to the Supreme Court succeeded in turning 
it into a general cause of action upon which judicial review can be 
founded.99  Initially, this development met considerable resistance,100 
 
 95 There are altogether some ten Basic Laws, most of which preceded the Basic Law of 
Human Dignity and Liberty. 
 96 HCJ 148/73 Kniel v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 794.  There was a quasi-
exception to this approach: HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Fin. [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693.  It 
concerned Section 4 of the Basic Law of The Knesset, which provides that election will be direct 
and equal and that this provision can only be changed by a majority of the Knesset Members (at 
least sixty-one).  The question that arose related to a law dealing with the finance provided by the 
State to parties that participate in the election.  This law denied any finance to new parties and it 
was argued that this infringed the requirement of equality included in the Basic Law.  The Court 
answered the question in the affirmative and held that the law on party finance can only be valid 
either by changing it to ensure equality or by passing it again with the required majority.  It 
should be noted that the Court had doubts whether the question of Knesset legislation is 
justiciable, but the Attorney General was not willing to raise the point.  In addition, the decision 
related to an “entrenched” provision in the Basic Law, namely one that specifically requires a 
special majority in order to be changed.  Most provisions in the Basic Laws do not have such a 
provision.  Finally, the Israeli Supreme Court recognized that there is no need to change the Basic 
Law itself.  It suffices that the modifying law is passed by the required majority, even if it is an 
“ordinary” law. 
 97 HCJ 212/03 Herut Nat’l Movement v. Chairman of Cent. Elections Comm. for the 
Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 570; EA 92/03 Mofaz v. Chairman of Cent. Elections 
Comm. for the Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 793, 810-11.  The statements were mere 
obiter. 
 98 HCJ 21/51 Binnenbaum v. Municipality of Tel-Aviv [1952] IsrSC 6, 375, 386. 
 99 HCJ 840/79 HaKablanim. v. Gov’t of Israel [1979] IsrSC 34(3) 729; HCJ 389/80 Dapei 
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but gradually it became well established. 
This cause of action led to a Court decision that ordered the 
Attorney General to prosecute and quashed his decision that there was 
no public interest in the indictment.101  In another case, the Court held 
that an appointment by the government of the Director General of the 
Ministry of Building was extremely unreasonable and should be 
quashed on the ground that the person appointed was involved in a 
serious crime for which he was reprieved before trial.102  An 
appointment may also be quashed as being unreasonable if the 
candidate expressed racial views (although he later apologized).103  
Over the years the cause of action of unreasonableness continued to 
grow, and in fact overshadowed all the traditional grounds for judicial 
review.  It is deceptively simple, it has no bounds, and it endows the 
Court with almost unlimited discretion.  Consequently, every 
governmental or administrative decision becomes in fact appealable and 
every appointment can be challenged in court on the ground of some 
misconduct in the candidate’s history. 
 
3.     Abolition of the Requirement of Standing 
 
The traditional rule provided that in order to submit a petition 
against a public authority the applicant must have “standing.”  The 
explanation was that “[i]t is clear that there is no legal process unless 
there is a dispute.  A person must come and claim his own right or 
injury.  In this respect the process in court differs from that before the 
legislative or the executive branch.”104  However, Justice Barak rejected 
the traditional approach, and posed the rhetorical question: “[W]hat is 
the moral basis for the approach that he who claims that his money was 
unlawfully stolen can apply to the court, but he who claims that the 
public’s money was unlawfully stolen cannot do so?”105  The 
requirement of standing has thus been abolished. 
 
Zahav Ltd. v. The Broad. Auth. [1980] IsrSC 35(1) 421. 
 100 Moshe Landau, On Justiciability and Reasonableness in Administrative Law, 14 TEL AVIV 
U. L. REV. 5 (1989) (Hebrew); see also M. Shaked, Comments on the Review of Reasonableness 
in Administrative Law, 12 MISHPATIM 102 (1982) (Hebrew). 
 101 HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Att’y Gen. [1990] IsrSC 44(2) 485. 
 102 HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Bldg. & Hous. [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229. 
 103 HCJ 4646/08 Lavi v. Prime Minister (not yet published). 
 104 HCJ 40/70 Becker v. Minister of Def. [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 238, 246. 
 105 HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Def. [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441, 465. 
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4.     Justiciability 
 
In Ressler v. Minister of Defense, the Court dismissed a petition 
against the Defense Minister on the ground that the matter was 
nonjusticiable, but Justice Barak in a very long obiter expressed his 
views on justiciability.106  He distinguished between “normative” and 
“institutional” justiciability.  As far as the normative aspect is 
concerned, every human act be it political or any other is justiciable.  
Barak was willing to concede that there is a question as to which 
institution is to deal with the matter.  Yet, this concession seems to be of 
little moment.  It is almost impossible to find any situation which in his 
view will be beyond the institutional competence of the Court.  Indeed, 
he expressed clear reservation regarding the decision in Reiner v. Prime 
Minister on diplomatic relations with Germany, posing the question as 
to why it could not be examined on grounds of reasonableness.107  In 
that case, Barak’s obiter remained a minority view.  President Shamgar 
supported the doctrine of justiciability,108 and the Vice President Ben-
Porat considered that there is no need to decide the boundaries of 
justiciability, though she was inclined to accept the approach of 
President Shamgar. 
When Barak became President of the Supreme Court, Shamgar and 
Ben-Porat had already retired.  In fact, none of the Justices that opposed 
Barak’s expansive views remained on the Court and the field became 
completely open.  The issue of justiciability was not expressly decided.  
But since then it has hardly ever been mentioned and it is practically 
impossible to find modern cases dismissing an application on the 
ground of nonjusticiability.  In reality, every governmental action, 
including military actions, can be litigated.  Indeed, even the highly 
political issue of evacuating the Gaza strip and the legislation that 
implemented it became the subject of a lengthy decision.109  Hence, in 
reality, this limitation upon the Court’s jurisdiction has been wiped out. 
What is behind all this?  The crux of the matter is very clear and 
simple.  The basic idea has been to transform the function of the Court.  
The Court should no longer be merely concerned with justiciable issues 
and with resolving disputes between parties.  The basic function of the 
Court, and this is the idea, is to oversee how the country is being run 
 
 106 The part in Barak’s decision dealing with justiciability is over thirty pages long.  Id. at 472-
507. 
 107 Id. at 477-79 (discussing HCJ 186/65 Reiner v. Prime Minister [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 485, 
487). 
 108 President Shamgar continues to this day to support the Reiner decision and he reaffirmed 
his position in his interview in Yedioth Ahronoth.  See infra note 112. 
 109 HCJ 1661/05 Regional Council of Gaza Beach v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 59(2) 481. 
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and to take part in the way that it is governed.  This is the reason why 
the Court accepts any application from any source.  The Court does not 
mind who brings it.  The Court says its function is to see that the 
country is being run properly.  Mr. Nathan Lewin mentioned that the 
Israeli Supreme Court has gone into areas which to an American lawyer 
are bizarre, such as reviewing the plea bargaining agreement with Mr. 
Katzav, the former President of Israel.  It also sounds bizarre to many 
Israelis.  But it all stems from the same approach.  The Court wants to 
control the way the executive, including the prosecution, functions.  
And this is the basic issue, namely what kind of Court has been created 
and what is its function. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Can you also tell us 
about the legislation that you proposed to limit the Supreme Court in 
Israel? 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: I tried to reintroduce the 
idea of justiciability and I made a list of matters that are not justiciable, 
for example, the way the government is formed.  It is unfortunate that 
the reintroduction of the idea of justiciability has to be done by way of 
legislation.  One would have expected the Court to reach it on its own, 
but if it does not, I think eventually there will have to be legislation. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Were there specific 
issues that you said would be nonjusticiable? 
PROFESSOR DANIEL FRIEDMANN: In the bill that I prepared, 
which was not submitted to the Knesset, I included certain matters of 
war and peace, certain matters of foreign relationship, and a general 
provision saying that the Court should not deal with nonjusticiable 
matters, leaving it to the Court to at least address the issue.  Currently, 
the Court does not even recognize that there is an issue.  It assumes 
automatically that everything is justiciable.   
The Court’s approach did not remain unchallenged.  Let me refer 
to two interviews that were given by former Presidents of the Supreme 
Court.  One was given by former President Moshe Landau, who retired 
in 1982.  He gave the interview eighteen years later.110  Landau leveled 
a devastating attack on Aharon Barak and the Supreme Court.  I would 
say that the review by Judge Posner of Barak’s book seems very 
moderate in comparison.  President Landau spoke of Barak leading the 
Court the wrong way and that the Court is assuming governmental 
power and that it gets involved in a morass of political opinions and 
beliefs, which is dangerous both for the State and for the Court.  To the 
question as to whether the Court has lost its humility, Landau replied: 
Most definitely.  It displays arrogance and pretension.  In The 
Republic, Plato suggested entrusting the government of the republic 
 
 110 See Ari Shavit, Judgment Day, HA’ARETZ (Tel Aviv), Oct. 6, 2000, available at 
http://christianactionforisrael.org/isreport/septoct00/landau.html. 
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to a class of elders who were specially trained and educated for this 
purpose.  It sometimes seems to me that most of the justices on the 
Supreme Court see themselves more or less as governing elders.111   
Another former President of the Supreme Court, Meir Shamgar, in 
a more recent interview stated: 
I consider that not everything is justiciable.  There are topics that 
belong to the province of other branches—the legislative or the 
executive. . . .  I think that separation of powers should be 
maintained and that each branch should be allowed to deal with its 
own matters. . . .  I do not think that there is a tendency to weaken 
the Court.  There is a tendency to prevent the Court from dealing 
with matters that it should not deal with.112 
Shamgar gave the famous example of Reiner v. Prime Minister,113 
which was concerned with the government decision to establish 
diplomatic relations with West Germany.  The Germans appointed Rolf 
Pauls, who was an officer in the German army in World War II, as their 
first ambassador.  Mr. Reiner applied to the Supreme Court for an order 
to prevent Mr. Pauls from entering the country.  Justice Sussman, in a 
brief decision less than one page long, stated: 
This is not a legal matter but a purely political one; it cannot be 
scrutinized by legal standards.  The question of confirming or 
rejecting a foreign ambassador is a political matter to be decided by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs or possibly the whole government.  
This is not a legal matter that can be examined in court.114 
This was the end of the matter.  But then came Barak, who said 
that everything is justiciable.  Since we have this fantastic cause of 
action of unreasonableness, which by the way is itself unreasonable, it is 
possible to adjudicate everything.  It is even reasonable for the Court to 
decide whether it is reasonable to establish diplomatic relations with 
Germany, or to confirm the German ambassador.  The Reiner case is the 
product of the “old” Supreme Court.  And I would say that for about 
forty years we had an excellent Supreme Court which acquired 
enormous prestige and had unequaled moral power.  It knew when it 
should be active, but it also realized its limits.  Now, all of this is over.  
It has been erased by the Court of Barak—part of it already in the days 
of Shamgar, but much of it in the days of Barak. 
What happened to our Supreme Court is that it appropriated great 
legal power, but lost most of its moral power.  If you look at the kind of 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 Arik Carmon & Amira Lam, Not Everything Is Justiciable, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH (Tel 
Aviv), Apr. 17, 2009, at 19 (translation from Hebrew). 
 113 HCJ 186/65 Reiner v. Prime Minister [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 485, 487.  Justice Sussmann 
became President of the Supreme Court and upon his resignation due to illness he was replaced 
by Justice Landau. 
 114 Id. 
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support that the Supreme Court had when Barak came into office and 
the kind of support that it had when he left the office, you can see the 
drastic fall in public support of the Supreme Court. 
There’s another point that I shall briefly mention.  It relates to the 
Attorney General.  It is relevant because the Court’s power is also 
reflected in the position of the Attorney General.  The Attorney General 
is the government’s legal advisor.  Yet it was held by the Supreme 
Court that the government is bound to follow his advice.115  Thus, the 
opinion of the Attorney General is no longer advice but a command.  
Consequently, since unreasonableness is a ground for judicial review 
and everything is justiciable, the Attorney General can intervene in any 
governmental action.  He can tell the government that in his view a 
certain appointment or some governmental decision is unreasonable, 
and the government will have to abide by this kind of advice.  That’s the 
kind of situation in which the government finds itself. 
Finally, the question is how could all of this have happened?  Why 
has there been no parliamentary reaction?  This is an important 
question, but I have no time to expand on it, so it will have to await 
another day. 
 
B.     Justice Elyakim Rubinstein 
 
To a great extent, this Conference has so far been imbalanced.  As 
you can see, our Court has been attacked by most of the Israeli 
participants except myself and also by Professor Posner, and Professor 
Halberstam in a way.  It is a pity because the picture that has been 
drawn here is, in my view, much distorted, despite the fact that not only 
is criticism of the Court or any other institution legitimate, but it could 
also be constructive, and my colleagues and I learn a lot from what 
people write. 
Unlike the United States or Canada, our country is still coping with 
existential problems, and this is besides the internal problems between 
Jews and Arabs, religious and non-religious Jews, and left and right.  
And the complexity of all of that must be borne in mind when you come 
to review the work of the Court. 
Israel is a Jewish and democratic State.  It is so defined in the two 
Basic Laws on human rights promulgated in 1992, the Basic Law of 
Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law of Freedom of 
Occupation.  In the Declaration of Independence of 1948 it was 
proclaimed as a Jewish State, but it was democratic from the beginning.  
Indeed, the Jewish population in the pre-state period had democratic 
 
 115 HCJ 4267/93 Amitai v. Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 441, 473. 
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institutions, sometimes named “state-on-the-way” or “state-in-the-
making.”  And the democratic principles are explicitly embedded in the 
Declaration of Independence, which serves in the Basic Laws of 1992 
as a statutory-constitutional source of interpretation.  Beyond that, a 
democratic state is relatively easy to define.  What is a Jewish State is of 
course very complex, very difficult from many aspects. 
The Supreme Court was established in the beginning of the State of 
Israel and it had to cope for its status in those days.  The gap that existed 
between the first generation of the Justices and the government was 
great.  For the first fifteen years of independence, David Ben-Gurion, 
the founding father, was at the helm while the Court had to establish its 
place, being composed of important lawyers and scholars, but not at all 
publicly recognized or well-known.  But it did a marvelous job, as even 
in those days it dealt with cases concerning human and civil rights, 
including the freedom of expression, the situation of Israeli Arabs, etc., 
and had the courage to face the government and insist on those rights.  
The Court became the guardian of human rights before any legislation.  
In 1992, the two Basic Laws dealing with civil rights were 
promulgated—raising rights proclaimed by the Court to a constitutional 
level.  Based on these, the Court in 1995 established its power of 
judicial review, in United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative 
Village.116  I believe it was a very proper decision, even if the Knesset 
made a mistake from its point of view, or did not pay attention to the 
meaning of its legislative act.  It is too late to change today, and the 
Knesset will not do it, in my view.  But the application of judicial 
review has been very meager, in a few cases, most of them really 
matters which are not at the center of public interest.  The Court has 
shown great restraint in constitutional judicial review, and I do not think 
anybody could argue about that.117 
Other than constitutional questions, we constantly look at 
humanitarian problems, which are within the regular work of the Court.  
Civil and human rights are high up on our docket.  The Court has tried 
to balance between the need for erecting the security fence between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority territories to protect our population 
from murderous terrorism, and the difficulties that it created to non-
combatant Palestinians, passage to their fields, and the like.  So what the 
Court did was to insert changes in the route of the fence that would 
enable easier movement for Palestinians.  There is no Guantanamo in 
Israel, but cases of the Guantanamo type would have come to our Court 
in a matter of days, and would be decided quickly. 
 
 116 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221. 
 117 In December 2009, the Court abolished a law privatizing a prison.  See HCJ 2605/05 
Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin. (Nov. 19, 2009), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf. 
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Indeed, you could argue that this or that case should or should not 
have been taken by the Court.  I would like to repeat, and this is 
something which is said responsibly, and I myself have been a student 
of the Court for many years—at the end of the day, the involvement of 
the Court has had a very positive effect on our government and its 
quality.  The Court has decided many times on questions of inequality 
of Israeli Arabs, on improper government appointments, budgeting 
inequality, and inequality in general.  Personally, I support these 
decisions.   
I support, for instance, going into appointments issues because in 
such cases, you help the government to avoid appointing people whose 
backgrounds demonstrate that they could not serve the public.  It 
usually has to be not just unreasonable, but extremely unreasonable, for 
the Court to interfere.  “Extremely unreasonable” means that no honest 
government could appoint this person to that particular job.  All such 
decisions are transparent and available for any criticism. 
Two last words, one about President Barak.  Barak has been 
attacked here.  He is not here.  Barak is a great jurist; in my view, he’s 
in a league by himself.  He is not only that.  He was a great judge.  He 
could make mistakes.  All of us can make mistakes.  I think that 
demonizing his work in a way is unfair to him.  I was in a minority 
against his view in certain cases when we sat together.  Barak has been 
a judicial leader, but he has also been part of a group.  He has 
contributed a lot to the State of Israel.  He is one of the most respected 
and recognized jurists in the world.  He has earned his proper place in 
history. 
Criticism of the Court is legitimate.  It is an integral part of the 
democratic discourse and the democratic discussion.  The dialogue 
between branches of government is vital; so is the media debate.  The 
problem lies elsewhere—it lies with the effort to delegitimize the Court 
by certain circles.   By portraying the Court—a hard-working 
professional institution which renders an important service to the 
country and to the public—sometimes as a power-mongering group of 
people, sometimes as a corrupt body, the confidence of various 
segments of the Israeli society is being eroded.  That is highly 
unfortunate.  The Court will in any way continue its work to the best of 
its abilities and carry the load.  It may make mistakes—who doesn’t—
but definitely its existence is vital for the State and its citizens, for 
human rights, and for civil rights.  I am proud to be part of it. 
Finally, the institution of the Attorney General of Israel was 
mentioned.  Having served in this position for almost seven years, let 
me add that the convention according to which the government and all 
its agencies on all levels are bound by the legal opinions of the Attorney 
General (subject to judicial scrutiny) has proven itself in preventing 
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irresponsible and illegal decisions and actions, not to mention (not too 
often, of course) corruption. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: Thank you.  I just 
wanted to say that Justice Barak was invited to the Conference.  In fact, 
the initial impetus for this Conference was a report by Steve Greenwald, 
the President of the American Association of Jewish Lawyers and 
Jurists (AAJLJ), to the AAJLJ Board, of a conversation he had with 
Justice Barak in which Barak told him that the Israeli Supreme Court 
was under attack.  Mr. Greewald suggested that we adopt a resolution 
supporting the Court.  Following the discussion that ensued, we decided 
to organize this Conference.  Steve Greenwald spoke to Justice Barak 
several times to ask him if he would participate.  We even offered to 
scheduled the Conference at a date of his choosing.  Had he come, it 
wouldn’t have been unbalanced.  But at the end, he decided not to 
come.  So, it’s not our fault that he’s not here and that the panel is 
unbalanced. 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER: I’m a Darwinian, and I believe that 
all organs, including artificial ones—institutions—are engaged in a 
struggle for survival, and that the losers become extinct.  So courts will 
try to maximize their political power, and if the other branches are 
weak, then the courts will become extremely powerful.  And it’s 
possible—that’s why I have reservations about criticizing Justice Barak 
not for his general jurisprudence but for his activity in the Israeli 
context—that the Israeli Supreme Court is filling a vacuum of some sort 
in the politics of Israel.  That is, I think, an implication of what Justice 
Rubinstein was just saying.  One reason that this hasn’t happened in the 
United States is precisely the political character of Supreme Court 
appointments.  Our Supreme Court is very aggressive, and it would like 
to increase its power and fill political vacuums like everyone else.  But 
when the Supreme Court has overplayed its hand, as it did before the 
Civil War, as it did in the Great Depression of the thirties, and as it did 
in the sixties (the Warren Court), there was always the possibility for 
the other branches to strike back, particularly through the appointments 
process.  If our Supreme Court gets to be an overmighty subject of the 
separation of powers, there is the possibility of a political retribution 
and change.  And that is very important and healthy. 
If you have a system in which the Justices appoint their successors, 
which I gather is the de facto system in Israel, that will reduce the 
power of the other branches.  It will unbalance the balance of powers, 
and it will make the Court exceptionally powerful and that can be a 
serious mistake and a source of great political strife. 
MINISTER MICHAEL EITAN: I wholly agree with Justice 
Rubinstein’s comments that the Israeli Supreme Court has had an 
important, positive impact on Israeli democracy, probably more so than 
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any other branch in the political system.  And despite differences in our 
world views, I acknowledge that Justice Barak has made major 
contributions to Israeli democracy. 
Let’s take, for example, the issue of freedom of speech.  To this 
day, no Israeli legislator has managed to pass a law protecting the basic 
right of freedom of speech.  Nevertheless, Israeli citizens enjoy a high 
level of freedom of speech, based on court decisions resulting from the 
judicial activism of the Israeli Supreme Court.  Even in the early days of 
the State, when the executive branch was very powerful under the 
leadership of Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Supreme Court chose to confront 
the executive branch on this issue and developed the right of freedom of 
speech through its rulings. 
Still, I think something is wrong with our balance of powers.  The 
judicial branch succeeded—via a judicial activist strategy and the 
weakness of the other two branches—in accumulating political power at 
the expense of the other branches.  For example, the Basic Law of 
Human Dignity and Liberty has been interpreted broadly by the Israeli 
Supreme Court, which in many cases has generated resentment among 
the majority of the members of the Knesset.  While hypothetically the 
Knesset could refute such rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court by 
passing legislation, it refrains from doing so due to its weak public 
image. 
Ultimately, all three branches need to work in balance for the 
people.  Each branch needs to understand its powers and limits.  The 
equilibrium of the governmental system is dependent on the self-
restraint of each branch.  Certainly, there are overlapping areas of 
authority and gray areas.  Nevertheless, there are clear cases of 
distortion of the separation of power between the branches—for 
example, when the Israeli Supreme Court interprets the scope of its 
authority to permit instructing the government to act illegally.  In such 
cases, where judges put themselves above the law and thereby destroy 
the sensitive equilibrium, the other branches should act to rein in the 
judiciary. 
PROFESSOR MALVINA HALBERSTAM: I just want to make 
two very brief points.  One, I want to make it very clear that, as I heard 
the attacks on the Supreme Court, they were not attacks on the Justices 
of the Supreme Court or even in many cases on its decisions.  They 
were attacks on the fact that the Court takes certain cases—a 
disagreement about the proper role of the Court.  There was nothing 
personal in it.  The other point I would like to make is the point that 
Judge Posner made.  Because it is a political process in the United 
States, the composition of the Court swings back and forth and it’s 
balanced.  The Court may go a little too far in one direction and then a 
different President appoints different Justices and then the Court may go 
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a little too far in the other direction.  But, it keeps going back and forth.  
That’s a limitation that does not exist in Israel at this point.   
I’ll ask Mr. Cotler to sum up and give us his views. 
 
C.     Hon. Irwin Cotler 
 
I’m going to speak about Canada’s constitutional revolution, at the 
center of which was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.118  
My basic thesis is that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—a 
parliamentary enactment—has had a transformative impact not only on 
our laws but on our lives, not only on how we litigate but on how we 
live.  Canadians now enjoy a panoply of rights and remedies that were 
inconceivable in pre-Charter law. 
Life and law before the Charter, from 1867 up to 1982, was a 
narrative of discrimination against disadvantaged groups in Canada, 
whether they be aboriginal people, women, racial and religious 
minorities, disabled individuals, or, more recently, gays and lesbians.  
But more than that, it was state-sanctioned discrimination.  Very often 
these discriminations were institutionalized at law, and so from a legal 
perspective there was no constitutional right to equality.  There were no 
entrenched constitutional rights of any kind and no constitutional right 
to a remedy. 
If you were to look at the first 115 years of Canadian constitutional 
history, it would reveal a preoccupation with the division of powers 
between the federal government and the provinces rather than with 
limitations on the exercise of power, whether federal or provincial.  As 
our former Chief Justice Bora Laskin summed it up, anytime a question 
of civil liberties came before the courts, the real question was which of 
the two levels of government had the power to work the injustice, not 
whether the injustice itself could be prohibited.  In other words, it was a 
powers process, a question of jurisdictional trespass, but not a rights 
process.  Then came the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and, on its 
tenth anniversary, a subsequent Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Justice Lamer, spoke of it as “[a] revolution on the scale of the 
introduction of the metric system, the great medical discoveries of Louis 
Pasteur, and the invention of penicillin and the laser.”119  You’ll never 
find a legal act that has such a set of metaphors attached to it in terms of 
its purported revolutionary impact.  Still another former Justice of the 
 
 118 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
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Terrain, 25 CANADIAN J. COMM. 397 (2000), available at http://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/ 
journal/article/view/1166/1085.  
 2454 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:6 
Supreme Court intimated, on the fifth anniversary of the Charter, that in 
Canada the cords of liberty had been stretched more in five years than 
they had in the United States in two hundred years. 
Such a constitutional revolution could not happen without 
controversy.  There were concerns then, and there are concerns now.  
First, that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms would inhibit police and 
prosecutorial work—that it effectively coddled criminals and 
undermined the government’s ability to protect national security.  
Second, that unelected, unaccountable, unrepresentative judges would 
usurp the power of Parliament on fundamental questions of public 
policy or core values.  Third, largely on the part of the Quebecois 
separatist party in Parliament, that the Charter effected not only a 
transfer of power from the courts to Parliament but a transfer of power 
to a federal institution—as they termed it—namely, the Supreme Court 
of Canada.  Fourth, largely on the part of critical legal theorists, that the 
Charter was in effect the instrument of corporations because they had 
the resources to invoke it whereas the disadvantaged did not.  Fifth, that 
the Charter of Rights spawned a kind of industry of rights claimants, 
and that this would undermine the communitarian ethos of Canada. 
All the same, the Charter’s revolutionary impact was and is 
evident.  Specifically, it was a revolution in five acts.  Act one was the 
announcement of the Charter project.  With that, Canada declared its 
intention to move from being a parliamentary democracy to being a 
constitutional democracy.  The courts moved from being the arbiters of 
federal-provincial jurisdictional concerns to being guarantors of rights.  
Through the Charter, Parliament vested in them that power.   
Act two was the transformative role played by civil society in this 
process.  The adoption of the Charter was preceded by a year of joint 
Senate and House of Commons committee hearings on the proposed 
new constitutional document.  It was referred to as the year of the 
constitution.  Hundreds of groups came to Parliament Hill to testify, and 
every single section of the resulting document bore the imprint of that 
process.  For example, with regard to Section 15, the Equality Rights 
Section, women’s groups found the language of protection proposed by 
the government to be vague.  The draft Section spoke of every 
individual having the right to equality before the law.  Civil society 
wanted every individual to be accorded the right to equality before the 
law and under the law, as well as equal protection and treatment of the 
laws, and, in particular, protection against discrimination.   As a result, 
twelve grounds were enumerated on which discrimination would 
henceforth be prohibited.   
Subsection 2 of Section 15, relating to affirmative action, likewise 
flowed from this consultative process.  What the United States has not 
been able to do, if you will, in 200 years, we constitutionalized in our 
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Charter of Rights.  Express protections for aboriginal people were 
incorporated, as well as a general reference to Canada’s multi-cultural 
society, elevating such protections into a constitutional norm. 
Section 11(g) is an interesting, indeed unusual provision.  It states 
that retroactivity shall not avail as a defense against prosecution where 
the crimes are criminal according to international law or according to 
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.  
That provision resulted from the concern of community groups that 
prosecution of Nazi war criminals might be struck down on grounds of 
retroactivity. 
Act three is the impact of the global human rights movement and 
international human rights law on the rights protection principles 
articulated in the Charter.  Judgment after judgment by the Supreme 
Court of Canada has affirmed that international law shall be a relevant 
and persuasive authority with respect to the interpretation and 
application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Whereas in the 
entire pre-Charter law there was only one case that applied  
international human rights law to rights protection in Canada, since 
1982 there have been countless more.  Indeed, the second edition of 
Professor William Schabas’s book on the impact of international rights 
on domestic law listed forty such cases.  In the third edition of the same 
book, the author stopped counting.120  He said there was no longer any 
point.    
Act four is certain unique cases, of which I will cite just one 
because it goes to all the key questions of justiciability, standing, and 
the like.  The case was decided within a year of the Charter’s advent.  It 
was called the Operation Dismantle case.121  It involved a coalition of 
disarmament and other activist groups seeking to enjoin the flight 
testing of U.S. cruise missiles over Canadian territory on the ground that 
such tests would escalate the Cold War arms race.  The coalition argued 
that allowing such tests would violate every individual’s right to life, 
liberty, and security under Section 7 of the new Charter.  The 
government lawyer at the time, Ian Binnie, who now sits on the 
Supreme Court, asked that the case be dismissed on the grounds that it 
was a frivolous and vexatious abuse of process that failed to disclose 
any reasonable cause of action.  But the case’s crux was the question 
whether the Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to the executive 
branch of government.  A literal reading of the Charter arguably 
indicated that it applied only to acts of Parliament.  But the courts 
concluded that it applied to the executive branch of government. 
 
 120 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN 
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Act five is the Charter’s impact on the role of the Minister of 
Justice and Attorney General.  This is manifold.  First, the Minister of 
Justice was given responsibility for certifying every prospective act of 
Parliament as comporting with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  If a prospective act is not so certified, it cannot proceed.  
This requirement applies to every parliamentary initiative of every 
agency and department of government.  Second, the Minister of Justice 
bears responsibility for any interventions before the Supreme Court.  
Third, the Minister must insure that all prosecutions in fact comport 
with constitutional obligations, full disclosure, and the like.  Fourth, the 
Minister has the unique responsibility in matters of wrongful 
convictions.  As Minister of Justice, I handled the fallout of the 
wrongful conviction of a man named Stephen Truscott, forty-six years 
after the man had originally been convicted.  Fifth, extradition is also an 
exclusive power of the Minister, along with the particular responsibility 
of making sure any decision to extradite comports with the Charter.   
For all of these reasons, I conclude that the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms has had a transformative impact not only on our laws but our 
lives.  It has attracted its share of controversy as a result, but what is 
uncontroversial is that the Charter has made for a revolutionary 
experience. 
 
